1. Von Manstein served under West Germany and obviously wrote his memoirs to shift all the blame in Hitler like many other Nazi generals that lived thru the war. At the same time, Manstein and his kind served their US masters to downplay Soviet successes.

2. To say that the Nazis had no chance of winning in Kursk or the entire war at that point in time is to say that they were all fighting in futility. Not very likely given the admiration these German professional generals actually elicited. The objective of Citadel was clear enough – to say it was futile is to say entire German High Command were madmen like Hitler. Prokhorovka itself shows that Soviet reserves were brought to action to counter German ‘ breakthrough ‘ notwithstanding all the Soviet defense preparation. Everything was therefore still hanging in the balance and Germany’s defeat though maybe foreseeable was not absolutely certain. After all, Model himself was present to try stop Normandy landings in June 1944. And from this time July 1943, the Nazis fought up to Berlin in 1945.

3. All these therefore trample on the poor pretense that Soviet tactics at this time were close to par with German military. Germany was simply overwhelmed and was eventually fighting on 3 fronts.

4. So the question, which side won the battle at Kursk? this issue will of course never be settled. some people try to play safe and say its a draw. still, if the figures are to be believed, Soviet losses were 3 or 4 times more than the Germans. though Germany is generally considered to be unable to replace its losses in the manner that the Soviets could, the fact remains – at that ration of 4:1 losses, the German forces of 900,00 at Kursk even if totally lost would take out 3.6 million Soviets. something to ponder.

To say that the Russians were inferior to German tactics is a fallacy. The Russians were able to improvise and develop strategies for beating the German Blitzkrieg and they also enjoyed the advantage of mass production of tanks and a nearly inexhaustible supply of manpower. The Germans, for all their tactical and fighting prowess (especially that of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps) could not afford such high losses.

They did it using Soviet equipment, Soviet manpower, and most of all Soviet tactics.

Any study of Soviet mobile warfare viewed from a narrow tactical level is pointless as the Soviets themselves view it as repeated combat situations needing no true inspiration or direct guidance. Basically tactical situations repeat themselves over and over again and there is no need to gain ‘tactical skills’ as those skills are learned on the battlefield not in the classroom.

If Kursk is viewed from the Operational/Strategic level, the view the Soviets consider important, then the Germans were out fought, out thought, and out maneuvered. Look at the battle from the start until the end of the Soviet counter-attacks. Soviet reserves were well placed to avoid getting ‘trapped’, and in position to blunt any real gains the Germans made. The Soviet operational plan, which Zhukov used again and again against the Germans before the Battle of Kursk, was to allow them to bleed themselves white against defensive positions. Once the Germans had reached their limit Zhukov counter-attacked, often with devastating results.

Hitler complained to Guderian that the “Army isn’t achieving the victories it did early in the war.” To which Hurry Heinz replied, “Change your methods.” The Soviets had learned and the Germans hadn’t changed. Proof, the Soviets fired a preliminary bombardment against the Germans before the start of their offensive. They knew from past experience when, where, and more importantly, at what time the German’s would reach their jump off points. The Germans got plastered and it delayed the entire offensive by a couple of hours.

Kursk looked at from this view shows the Germans to have placed themselves in a position to suffer defeat even before the first shot was fired.

While it is ‘nice’ to toss around tank loss ratios they miss the entire point of what actual victory on the battlefield is. Napoleon won the Battles of Quatra Bras and Ligney-Sombreffe but he lost the Battle of Waterloo, and therefore lost the war. The Germans may, or may not, have won a tactical victory at Kursk but in the end it didn’t matter because the Soviets ended up in control of Orel and Kharkov after the smoke had cleared. So in the end the Soviets achieved their conditions for victory while the Germans didn’t even come close to obtaining their aims.

Fact: The Germans had only a handful of Panthers and Tigers at Kursk the majority of their hardware was PzIIIs and PzIVs, both of which were outclassed by the T-34.

Fact: The army taking ground, which the Germans were when the offensive started, suffers fewer tank losses because they can recover their damaged tanks on the field the opponent cannot. It is only natural that the Soviet tank losses were higher at the start of the offensive. One then needs to look at German tank losses when the Soviets started their counter-offensive, and viola, they rocket upwards.

Fact: For all of 1943 the Panther was a ‘barn baby’ which spent most of its time in the repair depots getting repaired. In general, compared to both Soviet and US tanks, the German equipment was too complex to maintain and spent too much time broken instead of working. I would rather ride into battle in a reliable T-34, then risk my skin in an unreliable Panther, because if it breaks in the heat of battle (when the fuel pump goes or the front stabilizer crashes), then I am as good as dead.

Fact: People are often too blinded by the German ‘technical skills’ and supposed ‘tactical skills’ to see that it was the Germans who had lost the edge by 1943. It was they who had failed to learn and suffered for it. The same excuses that are used to explain German defeats are exactly the opposite of those used to explain German victories. The Allies had more and better tanks then the Germans in 1940 yet the Germans won. The same applied in Russia in 1941 and 1942, and yet the Germans were still winning. But hit 1943 and 1944 and suddenly it is the faceless hordes of Soviet men and equipment that just swamps the Germans under. You cannot use the same excuses for both. The Germans where still good, and well led in the field, but the truth is that the Soviets and the Allies had both caught up a good margin on both levels and it was therefore the Germans who failed to maintain their lead.

Germany was basically defeated in WWII not by neat military maneuvers, but by brute-force casualties. By war’s end, 50% of 1939 German male population were casualties. The Germans were run out of men, and Kursk contributed to that, same as all the other battles, regardless of who “won”.

But that is not the point. The very idea of encircling all the soviet force in Kursk area, just like the maneuvers of 1941-42, was absurd at that time. Russian generals were not stupid as they seemed before. Kursk was just too obvious, germans could never convince the russians they would not attack there. And due to the fact that russians themselves were already preparing their attack, it would not be wise to provoke them with ‘faints’ in the very area they intended to strike shortly after.

Most of russian armor were not deployed in the salient, but instead was withdrawn and spread around the vicinity for imediately engaging AFTER german offensive was done. They could never be encircled. Manstein hmself pointed that on his book, when arguing that the Kursk operation should’ve take place 2 months before, when russians were not yet prepared and their armor was still in the salient.

So, even if Masntein could actually encircle Kursk (which is absolutelly unlikely), he would still have to face a russian armored counterattack, for he could never destroy all enemy tanks in the area. It would be, at the very best, a Pyrrhic victory instead of a “lost victory”. And to even dream of Moscow after all this nightmare, well..

And that’s not all, folks. It’s widely accepted today that the soviets lost about 50% of their tanks in the whole operation. But how could they lose so many tanks in the south of the salient since they’ve placed most of their power in the north, where they were expecting to face german’s main attack? Most of all: how could they breach and advance so fast in order to liberate Kharkov if they were so beaten by Manstein’s forces? And, what’s most interesting: how could they NOT ADVANCE in the north? I believe the answer is quite obvious. The Hagen Line blocked russian advance and certainly have cost a lot of tanks to them. Kluge was right in his intuition to prepare a defensive line, so he could hold ground even facing the enemy’s large force. But Manstein didn’t do so. No surprise he would change his own opinion about the real enemy’s force in a matter of weeks. And those who have read his book should pay attention to the conditions he established to achieve victory in Kursk. Not only his south wing should be reinforced with another Panzer Army and SS divisions, but also de north wing should keep the pressure in order to neutralize the enemy’s capability of maneuver. In other words, he wanted Model to bleed to death losing all his few tanks so he could achieve victory in the south, but he never asked himself why Model refused to do so. And in the end, it was Model’s parcimony that ensured the survival of Army Group Center for at least a year more. Army Group South instead was so depaupered in the Kursk battle that would therefore become a minor force in the whole campaign in the Eastern Front.

The Germans used extensive aerial surveillance before the attack. They should have known about the extensive Russian defenses. Heinz Guderian knew that Blitzkrieg meant fast moving and deep penetrating panzer divisions disrupting the enemy from behind and encircling enemy formations. This tactic was not used in Citadel; the entire operation turned into a slugfest.

Had the Germans used a northern faint using older tanks backed up with 88s in a slow advance, the main force could have struck from a hundred miles south of the salient and then employed Blitzkrieg tactics to encircle the static defenses at Kursk. This would have been a devastating defeat for the Russians. They would have lost thousands of vehicles and armor in addition to at least a million men. Depending on German losses and fuel reserves, they may well have been able to push on to Moscow. I don’t think the Russians could have recovered from losses like that again. The initiative would have been reestablished and with the new weapons (which were far superior to anything the Russians had) I think Germany would have prevailed.

The big mistake with Barbarossa wasn’t in the idea of attacking Russia, it was the strategic tactics again and not using all the weapons the Germans had. First, the Germans should have made sure Japan would attack the Russians in the east. That would have pinned down the Siberian divisions. Second, instead of three army groups, I would have used two (middle and north) and just played defense in the south. The two attacking armies would have a main priority of capturing Leningrad. With Leningrad captured, the Germans would have had a port to make supply much easier. The capture of Leningrad would have been easy in my plan because instead of wasting the German surface navy in stupid Atlantic raids, I would have used the great ships like Bismarck, Tirpitz, the pocket battleships and other ships along with the army and Luftwaffe to take Leningrad. Those ships would have pounded the hell out of Russian defenses. It is true that forward airbases would need to be established to protect the ships before their arrival.

Once the port was secured, supplying the army would have been much easier. A winter offensive might have even been possible to cut Russian supplies from their northern ports or later in 1942 a major offensive to capture Moscow would have been possible. In any event, the idea of only going so far and then resupplying would have served the Germans far better and using their naval firepower effectively instead of wasting their ships would have easily put them over the top at Leningrad.