Comments on: Battle of Khe Sanh: Recounting the Battle's Casualties http://www.historynet.com/battle-of-khe-sanh-recounting-the-battlescasualties.htm?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=battle-of-khe-sanh-recounting-the-battlescasualties From the World's Largest History Magazine Publisher Wed, 15 Feb 2012 04:36:36 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3 By: Peter Brush http://www.historynet.com/battle-of-khe-sanh-recounting-the-battlescasualties.htm#comment-784929 Peter Brush Tue, 20 Dec 2011 13:39:44 +0000 #comment-784929 Joe, you say, "But what is also history is the 78 day siege which was broken by the 1st Air Cavalry augmented by supporting forces in Operation Pegaseus." True, of course. But what is the significance of that? Seems like that is the point. Pegasus is significant to you and to me, because we were participants. But beyond that, what was the significance of Pegasus? In other words, what is the significance of ending the siege? It meant Route 9 was now open. When did the siege begin? Let's pick January 21 1968, when the NVA attacks begain in earnest. What was the situation before that? Route 9 was closed, and had been closed since September 1967. In fact, Route 9 was closed from September 1964 until March 1967. It was open from March-September 1967, then closed until Pegasus opened it in April 1968. My point here is that it was normal for Route 9 to be closed. The NVA began leaving before Pegasus began. Most left, some stayed. Pegasus opened Route 9 on April 8 1968. Heavy traffic could now get to Khe Sanh via land route. Supplies poured into to support 1 ACD and Marine operations. A week later 1 ACD left. Now Khe Sanh could be supplied by overland convoy. That meant the NVA could attack the convoys. That's what they did. For example, on May 19 they launched a large attack on a Marine road sweep operation. 37 Marines and 300 NVA were killed. That month, 149 Marines and 19 soldiers died around Khe Sanh. Because the road was open, it was easier to dismantle the base. The base was dismantled. Fighting continued. The NVA kept shelling the base. A year later the situation was the same. The NVA were back and the Marines were fighting them. Have you read Karl Marlantes' book Matterhorn? It's about the Marines fighting the NVA in this area in early 1969, same as Marines were fighting the NVA in the same area two years earlier, and one year earlier. So overall, what was the significance of Pegasus? Keep in mind that the siege wasn't really a siege in the literal sense of the word. Supplies were delivered. Killed and wounded were evacuated. Marines arrived for duty, and went home if their tours were up. Marines went to and from R&R during the siege. Operationally, what difference did it make? Peter Brush Joe, you say, "But what is also history is the 78 day siege which was broken by the 1st Air Cavalry augmented by supporting forces in Operation Pegaseus." True, of course. But what is the significance of that? Seems like that is the point.

Pegasus is significant to you and to me, because we were participants. But beyond that, what was the significance of Pegasus? In other words, what is the significance of ending the siege? It meant Route 9 was now open.

When did the siege begin? Let's pick January 21 1968, when the NVA attacks begain in earnest. What was the situation before that? Route 9 was closed, and had been closed since September 1967. In fact, Route 9 was closed from September 1964 until March 1967. It was open from March-September 1967, then closed until Pegasus opened it in April 1968.

My point here is that it was normal for Route 9 to be closed.

The NVA began leaving before Pegasus began. Most left, some stayed. Pegasus opened Route 9 on April 8 1968. Heavy traffic could now get to Khe Sanh via land route. Supplies poured into to support 1 ACD and Marine operations. A week later 1 ACD left.

Now Khe Sanh could be supplied by overland convoy. That meant the NVA could attack the convoys. That's what they did. For example, on May 19 they launched a large attack on a Marine road sweep operation. 37 Marines and 300 NVA were killed. That month, 149 Marines and 19 soldiers died around Khe Sanh.

Because the road was open, it was easier to dismantle the base. The base was dismantled. Fighting continued. The NVA kept shelling the base.

A year later the situation was the same. The NVA were back and the Marines were fighting them. Have you read Karl Marlantes' book Matterhorn? It's about the Marines fighting the NVA in this area in early 1969, same as Marines were fighting the NVA in the same area two years earlier, and one year earlier.

So overall, what was the significance of Pegasus? Keep in mind that the siege wasn't really a siege in the literal sense of the word. Supplies were delivered. Killed and wounded were evacuated. Marines arrived for duty, and went home if their tours were up. Marines went to and from R&R during the siege.

Operationally, what difference did it make?

Peter Brush

]]> By: Joe Abodeely http://www.historynet.com/battle-of-khe-sanh-recounting-the-battlescasualties.htm#comment-784867 Joe Abodeely Mon, 19 Dec 2011 16:10:32 +0000 #comment-784867 Peter: It's taken us long enough, but I think we pretty much agree on everything you just wrote. The action at Khe Sanh was the Marines' role. Nobody (including, and especially me) cannot take that away from the Marines. And in the course of their operations and defence of KSFB, the situation changed with the introduction of two NVA divisions, the artillery pounding, the mortar and rocket attacks, and the ambushes on the patrols. You know all of this. That is history. But what is also history is the 78 day siege which was broken by the 1st Air Cavalry augmented by supporting forces in Operation Pegaseus. Its casualties were minimal which is to its credit--not to its detriment. Many NVA left at various times for various reasons which is to its credit--not its detriment. And the concept of air cavalry--quick manueverability and shock action--to accomplish the three-fold mission (kill NVA, clear route 9, and end the siege) was accomplished in only one week in Operation Pegasus. That is to its credit, not its detriment. The story of the hill fights and the defense of Khe Sanh is the story of the Marines. The story of the relief of the siege of Khe Sanh in Operation Pegasus by the air cavaly tactics is the story of the 1st Air Cavalry Division. They are separate but complimentary. That's my opinion and I think that is history. Peter: It's taken us long enough, but I think we pretty much agree on everything you just wrote. The action at Khe Sanh was the Marines' role. Nobody (including, and especially me) cannot take that away from the Marines. And in the course of their operations and defence of KSFB, the situation changed with the introduction of two NVA divisions, the artillery pounding, the mortar and rocket attacks, and the ambushes on the patrols. You know all of this. That is history. But what is also history is the 78 day siege which was broken by the 1st Air Cavalry augmented by supporting forces in Operation Pegaseus. Its casualties were minimal which is to its credit–not to its detriment. Many NVA left at various times for various reasons which is to its credit–not its detriment. And the concept of air cavalry–quick manueverability and shock action–to accomplish the three-fold mission (kill NVA, clear route 9, and end the siege) was accomplished in only one week in Operation Pegasus. That is to its credit, not its detriment. The story of the hill fights and the defense of Khe Sanh is the story of the Marines. The story of the relief of the siege of Khe Sanh in Operation Pegasus by the air cavaly tactics is the story of the 1st Air Cavalry Division. They are separate but complimentary. That's my opinion and I think that is history.

]]> By: Peter Brush http://www.historynet.com/battle-of-khe-sanh-recounting-the-battlescasualties.htm#comment-784862 Peter Brush Mon, 19 Dec 2011 13:27:36 +0000 #comment-784862 Joe, thanks for the clarifications. I'm glad to learn we agree on most of these points. Regarding your comment, "I've read some of your writings and you seem to go out of your way to minimize the role of Operation Pegasus in the relief of the siege of Khe Sanh," it's not that I minimize the role of Pegasus in the *relief* of Khe Sanh so much as I minimize the role of Pegasus in the history of the Marines at Khe Sanh. The Marines were involved in many named operations around Khe Sanh. I personally was in four of these operations. Marines fougnt and died there from January 1967 until the base closed in July 1968. Two of the Marine battles at Khe Sanh were of significance. Both were before Operation Pegasus. Pegasus lasted two weeks, and casualties were light, less than anticipated. Given the long history of Americans and Marines at Khe Sanh, Pegasus doesn't seem all that important. Sorry, but that's how it seems to me. One thing in my opinion that *is* under emphasized is the role of the Army at FOB-3 at Khe Sanh. They were in the area before, during, and after the time when the Marines were there. Joe, thanks for the clarifications. I'm glad to learn we agree on most of these points. Regarding your comment, "I've read some of your writings and you seem to go out of your way to minimize the role of Operation Pegasus in the relief of the siege of Khe Sanh," it's not that I minimize the role of Pegasus in the *relief* of Khe Sanh so much as I minimize the role of Pegasus in the history of the Marines at Khe Sanh. The Marines were involved in many named operations around Khe Sanh. I personally was in four of these operations. Marines fougnt and died there from January 1967 until the base closed in July 1968. Two of the Marine battles at Khe Sanh were of significance. Both were before Operation Pegasus.

Pegasus lasted two weeks, and casualties were light, less than anticipated. Given the long history of Americans and Marines at Khe Sanh, Pegasus doesn't seem all that important. Sorry, but that's how it seems to me.

One thing in my opinion that *is* under emphasized is the role of the Army at FOB-3 at Khe Sanh. They were in the area before, during, and after the time when the Marines were there.

]]> By: Joe Abodeely http://www.historynet.com/battle-of-khe-sanh-recounting-the-battlescasualties.htm#comment-784744 Joe Abodeely Sat, 17 Dec 2011 00:10:21 +0000 #comment-784744 Peter: I was aware of the intent to go into Laos. That mission was never authorized. Years later the Cav led the assault into Cambodia. You will recall all the heat Nixon took for that. The following is from my article in Vietnam magazine: "The Marines' mission at Khe Sanh was to block the North Vietnamese infiltration across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and to establish a jumping-off point for a proposed but never authorized American advance into the panhandle of Laos to cut off the Ho Chi Minh Trail." The 1st Air Cavalry Division because of its unique nature was the only unit in Vietnam that could be tasked with a mission to go to Khe Sanh or Laos or Cambodia or as we did go to the A Shau Valley.I am a big fan of air cavalry and the Army gave it up to the 101st who don't do air cavalry. Cavalry has always had its limitations, but it has always had its strengths. It is best suited for COIN which we seem to have recently reinvented. Joe Peter: I was aware of the intent to go into Laos. That mission was never authorized. Years later the Cav led the assault into Cambodia. You will recall all the heat Nixon took for that. The following is from my article in Vietnam magazine: "The Marines' mission at Khe Sanh was to block the North Vietnamese infiltration across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and to establish a jumping-off point for a proposed but never authorized American advance into the panhandle of Laos to cut off the Ho Chi Minh Trail." The 1st Air Cavalry Division because of its unique nature was the only unit in Vietnam that could be tasked with a mission to go to Khe Sanh or Laos or Cambodia or as we did go to the A Shau Valley.I am a big fan of air cavalry and the Army gave it up to the 101st who don't do air cavalry. Cavalry has always had its limitations, but it has always had its strengths. It is best suited for COIN which we seem to have recently reinvented.
Joe

]]> By: Peter Brush http://www.historynet.com/battle-of-khe-sanh-recounting-the-battlescasualties.htm#comment-784723 Peter Brush Fri, 16 Dec 2011 14:30:14 +0000 #comment-784723 Joe, I mentioned that one reason Operation Pegasus was so large was because one of its original goals was to invade Laos after opening Route 9 and attacking NVA forces around Khe Sanh. You seemed unaware of this fact, so I reseached some details for you. Planning for Pegasus began in late January. At a Pegasus planning session in March in Da Nang of senior Army and Marine commanders Westmoreland ordered contingency plans made for brigade size cross-border operations in Laos after Route 9 was opened. As noted in Prados and Stubbe's history of the battle (Valley of Decision), "Thus, as of March 10, MACV explicitly intended to be prepared for a coup de main thrust into Laos in conjunction with the relief of Khe Sanh (p. 418-419)." Final Pegasus plans were firmed up at a March 28 meeting. Westmoreland noted it would take two weeks to get permission for the thrust into Laos from Ambassador Sullivan and Washington, DC. On March 30, Westmoreland was briefed in Saigon on plans for Operation El Paso City, his long held plans for a major advance into Laos. On April 10, General Tolson, "without warning," received orders from Westmoreland to prepare for an immediate assault into the A Shau Valley. That's because Westmoreland was unable to get permission to invade Laos. Joe, I mentioned that one reason Operation Pegasus was so large was because one of its original goals was to invade Laos after opening Route 9 and attacking NVA forces around Khe Sanh. You seemed unaware of this fact, so I reseached some details for you.

Planning for Pegasus began in late January. At a Pegasus planning session in March in Da Nang of senior Army and Marine commanders Westmoreland ordered contingency plans made for brigade size cross-border operations in Laos after Route 9 was opened. As noted in Prados and Stubbe's history of the battle (Valley of Decision), "Thus, as of March 10, MACV explicitly intended to be prepared for a coup de main thrust into Laos in conjunction with the relief of Khe Sanh (p. 418-419)."

Final Pegasus plans were firmed up at a March 28 meeting. Westmoreland noted it would take two weeks to get permission for the thrust into Laos from Ambassador Sullivan and Washington, DC.

On March 30, Westmoreland was briefed in Saigon on plans for Operation El Paso City, his long held plans for a major advance into Laos.

On April 10, General Tolson, "without warning," received orders from Westmoreland to prepare for an immediate assault into the A Shau Valley. That's because Westmoreland was unable to get permission to invade Laos.

]]> By: Joe Abodeely http://www.historynet.com/battle-of-khe-sanh-recounting-the-battlescasualties.htm#comment-784696 Joe Abodeely Thu, 15 Dec 2011 22:12:29 +0000 #comment-784696 Casualities do not always tell the complete story. That was one of the problems with the entire war--success was measured by the number of casualities inflicted on the enemy--body count. and of course those numbers were not always accurate. Tactics influenced success. Marine tactics often were to charge into the fray and thereby incurr numerous casualities. Air cavalry tactics employed voluminous artillery barrages, helicopter gunship fire support, and the maneuvering of light infantry. The 1st Air Cavalry suffered less casualities than the Marines due to our capabilities and fire support in Pegasus. After clearing route 9, we provided some security when the bridges were being repaired. I remember seeing a Marine platoon with M-14 rifles, a 2.5 inch rocket launcher and older radios. Modern equipment also helps. Interestingly, the 1st Cavalry had the most casualities of any unit in Vietnam probably due to its size and active participation in numerous operations. LTG Tolson commented about the 26the Marines: "I was anxious to get the 26th Marine Regiment out of their static defense position as soon as feasible; so, on D+3, I ordered Colonel Lownds to make a battalion-size attack south from Khe Sanh to seize Hill 471, a strategic piece of terrain affording a commanding view of the base. Following a heavy artillery preparation, the Marines successfully seized the hill killing thirty of the enemy. On the same day, the 2d Brigade of the Cavalry Division assaulted one battalion into an old French fort south of Khe Sanh. Initial contact resulted in four enemy killed. The remaining uncommitted brigade was moved into marshalling areas." Please stop misrepresenting that I have not given credit to the Marines in Operation Pegasus. I wish you'd give the air cavalry credit for ending the siege--most other reasonable people do. Casualities do not always tell the complete story. That was one of the problems with the entire war–success was measured by the number of casualities inflicted on the enemy–body count. and of course those numbers were not always accurate. Tactics influenced success. Marine tactics often were to charge into the fray and thereby incurr numerous casualities. Air cavalry tactics employed voluminous artillery barrages, helicopter gunship fire support, and the maneuvering of light infantry. The 1st Air Cavalry suffered less casualities than the Marines due to our capabilities and fire support in Pegasus. After clearing route 9, we provided some security when the bridges were being repaired. I remember seeing a Marine platoon with M-14 rifles, a 2.5 inch rocket launcher and older radios. Modern equipment also helps. Interestingly, the 1st Cavalry had the most casualities of any unit in Vietnam probably due to its size and active participation in numerous operations. LTG Tolson commented about the 26the Marines:
"I was anxious to get the 26th Marine Regiment out of their static defense position as soon as feasible; so, on D+3, I ordered Colonel Lownds to make a battalion-size attack south from Khe Sanh to seize Hill 471, a strategic piece of terrain affording a commanding view of the base. Following a heavy artillery preparation, the Marines successfully seized the hill killing thirty of the enemy. On the same day, the 2d Brigade of the Cavalry Division assaulted one battalion into an old French fort south of Khe Sanh. Initial contact resulted in four enemy killed. The remaining uncommitted brigade was moved into marshalling areas." Please stop misrepresenting that I have not given credit to the Marines in Operation Pegasus. I wish you'd give the air cavalry credit for ending the siege–most other reasonable people do.

]]> By: Joe Abodeely http://www.historynet.com/battle-of-khe-sanh-recounting-the-battlescasualties.htm#comment-784684 Joe Abodeely Thu, 15 Dec 2011 17:32:22 +0000 #comment-784684 Peter: You misstate my position. I have never said that Marines were not involved in Operation Pegasus. That is why I presented some of LTG Tolson's report on the operation which clearly shows Marines involvement. My point has always been that the operation was primarily a 1st Air Cavalry operation AUGMENTED by Marines and ARVNs. I previously stated that Tolson wrote: "The basic concept of Operation PEGASUS was as follows: The 1st Marine Regiment with two battalions would launch a ground attack west toward Khe Sanh while the 3d Brigade would lead the 1st Cavalry air assault. On D+1 and D+2 all elements would continue to attack west toward Khe Sanh; and, on the following day, the 2d Brigade of the Cavalry would land three battalions southeast of Khe Sanh and attack northwest. The 26th Marine Regiment, which was holding Khe Sanh, would attack south to secure Hill 471. On D+4, the 1st Brigade would air assault just south of Khe Sanh and attack north. The following day the 3d Army of the Republic of Vietnam Airborne Task Force would air assault southwest of Khe Sanh and attack toward Lang Vei Special Forces Camp. Linkup was planned at the end of seven days." This is the second time I've acknowledged the role of the 26th Marine Regiment. They ultimately did take Hill 471 in a bloody fight. I've told you several times that I am not taking anything away from the actions of the Marines. I just want to insure that the greatest "air cavalry" operation in the history of the United States military is properly acknowledged. I've read some of your writings and you seem to go out of your way to minimize the role of Operation Pegasus in the relief of the siege of Khe Sanh. Perhaps some fellow Marines may like this approach and maybe even some magazines may like it, but I know better. Opertion Pegasus was devised to send in the 1st Air Cavalry Division augmented by Marines and ARVNs to perform a three-fold mission (1) clear route 9, (2) kill NVA, and (3) end the siege. It did all three in one week. Yes, you are correct about my being very proud to have been a part of that opertion, but you are wrong that I have not given credit to the Marines involved. And please don't play that game with me about not honoring those who died. I understand all that stuff--been there, done that. Peter: You misstate my position. I have never said that Marines were not involved in Operation Pegasus. That is why I presented some of LTG Tolson's report on the operation which clearly shows Marines involvement. My point has always been that the operation was primarily a 1st Air Cavalry operation AUGMENTED by Marines and ARVNs. I previously stated that Tolson wrote:
"The basic concept of Operation PEGASUS was as follows: The 1st Marine Regiment with two battalions would launch a ground attack west toward Khe Sanh while the 3d Brigade would lead the 1st Cavalry air assault. On D+1 and D+2 all elements would continue to attack west toward Khe Sanh; and, on the following day, the 2d Brigade of the Cavalry would land three battalions southeast of Khe Sanh and attack northwest. The 26th Marine Regiment, which was holding Khe Sanh, would attack south to secure Hill 471. On D+4, the 1st Brigade would air assault just south of Khe Sanh and attack north. The following day the 3d Army of the Republic of Vietnam Airborne Task Force would air assault southwest of Khe Sanh and attack toward Lang Vei Special Forces Camp. Linkup was planned at the end of seven days." This is the second time I've acknowledged the role of the 26th Marine Regiment. They ultimately did take Hill 471 in a bloody fight. I've told you several times that I am not taking anything away from the actions of the Marines. I just want to insure that the greatest "air cavalry" operation in the history of the United States military is properly acknowledged. I've read some of your writings and you seem to go out of your way to minimize the role of Operation Pegasus in the relief of the siege of Khe Sanh. Perhaps some fellow Marines may like this approach and maybe even some magazines may like it, but I know better. Opertion Pegasus was devised to send in the 1st Air Cavalry Division augmented by Marines and ARVNs to perform a three-fold mission (1) clear route 9, (2) kill NVA, and (3) end the siege. It did all three in one week. Yes, you are correct about my being very proud to have been a part of that opertion, but you are wrong that I have not given credit to the Marines involved. And please don't play that game with me about not honoring those who died. I understand all that stuff–been there, done that.

]]> By: Peter Brush http://www.historynet.com/battle-of-khe-sanh-recounting-the-battlescasualties.htm#comment-784681 Peter Brush Thu, 15 Dec 2011 17:18:04 +0000 #comment-784681 Joe, one way to look at the contributions of both the 1st ACD and 26th Marines in Operation Pegasus is by examining casualties. As my article notes, casualties are complicated. The 1 ACD AAR on Opn PEGASUS (Tab D, Losses) shows 59 ACD KIA. The Provisional Corps Vietnam AAR on Opn PEGASUS shows 41 USA KIA. Stubbe's Battalion of Kings lists 45 Cav KIA by name. I may have missed a few that did not have Cav unit designations that I recognize as Cav. The 26th Marine AAR for Opn PEGASUS lists 43 Marines KIA. Stubbe's Battalion of Kings lists 50 KIA in the 26th Marines for Opn PEGASUS This shows that 26th Marines KIA and 1 ACD KIA were about the same. That's in an operation you can't even admit the 26th Marines participated in. Joe, one way to look at the contributions of both the 1st ACD and 26th Marines in Operation Pegasus is by examining casualties. As my article notes, casualties are complicated.

The 1 ACD AAR on Opn PEGASUS (Tab D, Losses) shows 59 ACD KIA. The Provisional Corps Vietnam AAR on Opn PEGASUS shows 41 USA KIA. Stubbe's Battalion of Kings lists 45 Cav KIA by name. I may have missed a few that did not have Cav unit designations that I recognize as Cav.

The 26th Marine AAR for Opn PEGASUS lists 43 Marines KIA. Stubbe's Battalion of Kings lists 50 KIA in the 26th Marines for Opn PEGASUS

This shows that 26th Marines KIA and 1 ACD KIA were about the same. That's in an operation you can't even admit the 26th Marines participated in.

]]> By: Peter Brush http://www.historynet.com/battle-of-khe-sanh-recounting-the-battlescasualties.htm#comment-784676 Peter Brush Thu, 15 Dec 2011 13:19:06 +0000 #comment-784676 Joe, I see a lot of irony in your position. You're concerned that many 1st ACD soldiers died to relieve the Marines in Operation Pegasus, and don't like "uinformed people spouting off misstatements which don't give credit where credit is due thereby insulting the sacrifices that those [Cav] soldiers made." Yet you can't bring yourself to admit the 26th Marines were even participants in Operation Pegasus. Whether they were or not is not a matter of opinion, yours or mine. It's a matter of fact, a fact confirmed by the commander of the 1st ACD, General Tolson. 60 soldiers died in Operation Pegasus, mostly troopers from the 1st ACD but also including a few Special Forces soldiers from FOB-3. 105 Marines died in Operation Pegasus, including Marines from the 26th Marine regiment, their corpsmen, Marines from other units in Pegasus, and a few Marine pilots who died supporting Pegasus. The names of these soldiers and Marines, plus dates and circumstances of their deaths, are listed in the book I mentioned, Battalion of Kings. You talk about acknowledging sacrifice in Pegasus, yet are so full of self-pride you cannot even admit much less give credit to the Marines who died in Pegasus. No doubt their deaths saved the lives of Cav troopers. Joe, I see a lot of irony in your position. You're concerned that many 1st ACD soldiers died to relieve the Marines in Operation Pegasus, and don't like "uinformed people spouting off misstatements which don't give credit where credit is due thereby insulting the sacrifices that those [Cav] soldiers made."

Yet you can't bring yourself to admit the 26th Marines were even participants in Operation Pegasus. Whether they were or not is not a matter of opinion, yours or mine. It's a matter of fact, a fact confirmed by the commander of the 1st ACD, General Tolson.

60 soldiers died in Operation Pegasus, mostly troopers from the 1st ACD but also including a few Special Forces soldiers from FOB-3. 105 Marines died in Operation Pegasus, including Marines from the 26th Marine regiment, their corpsmen, Marines from other units in Pegasus, and a few Marine pilots who died supporting Pegasus. The names of these soldiers and Marines, plus dates and circumstances of their deaths, are listed in the book I mentioned, Battalion of Kings.

You talk about acknowledging sacrifice in Pegasus, yet are so full of self-pride you cannot even admit much less give credit to the Marines who died in Pegasus. No doubt their deaths saved the lives of Cav troopers.

]]> By: Joe Abodeely http://www.historynet.com/battle-of-khe-sanh-recounting-the-battlescasualties.htm#comment-784650 Joe Abodeely Thu, 15 Dec 2011 01:06:23 +0000 #comment-784650 Peter: LTG Tolson's report said: "To accomplish the mission, the 1st Cavalry Division would be augmented by the following non-divisional units: 1st Marine Regiment, 26th Marine Regiment, III Army of the Republic of Vietnam Airborne Task Force, and the 37th Army of the Republic of Vietnam Ranger Battalion. In all, I would have over 30,000 troops under my direct operational control." He did NOT use all the Marines in the AO. Tolson further reported: "The basic concept of Operation PEGASUS was as follows: The 1st Marine Regiment with two battalions would launch a ground attack west toward Khe Sanh while the 3d Brigade would lead the 1st Cavalry air assault. On D+1 and D+2 all elements would continue to attack west toward Khe Sanh; and, on the following day, the 2d Brigade of the Cavalry would land three battalions southeast of Khe Sanh and attack northwest. The 26th Marine Regiment, which was holding Khe Sanh, would attack south to secure Hill 471. On D+4, the 1st Brigade would air assault just south of Khe Sanh and attack north. The following day the 3d Army of the Republic of Vietnam Airborne Task Force would air assault southwest of Khe Sanh and attack toward Lang Vei Special Forces Camp. Linkup was planned at the end of seven days." My point was not to insult the efforts of the Marines but rather to clarify that 10,000 Marines were not actively involved in Operation Pegasus. Pegasus was an air mobile operation primarily conducted by an AIR CAVALRY DIVISION with the unique capabilities of such a unit--organic helicopters for troop transport, artillery transport, supply transport, and fire support and reconaissance. You make the point that the NVA did not have enough troops to overrun KSFB when the Cav arrived. You may be correct for the reason I've previously stated--they came and went at will. That is why the Cav was necessary to make sure they quit the siege and to open Route 9. The NVA were able to do more than harrass the base after the Cav left as the battle of Dai Do (not that many clicks away) showed. My question to you is that if the siege was over, why did command consider it still in existence and send the 1st Air Cavalry Division to end it? That was one of its specific missions--which it accomplished. If the siege was over before the Cav arrived, why were the Marines still not controlling Route 9 or the surrounding area? And, please, LAPES did not end the siege--it made it more bearable. LAPES did not kill NVA, clear route 9, or end the siege--the 1st Air Cavalry did. Let me be clear about NVA in the area--many fled but many did not and still needed to be cleared out. The Cav did that. LTG Tolson wrote in his report on Operation Pegasus: "At 0800 on 8 April the relief of Khe Sanh was effected and the 1st Cavalry Division became the new landlord. The 3d Brigade airlifted its command post into Khe Sanh and Colonel Campbell assumed the mission of securing the area. This was accomplished after the 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry successfully cleared Highway Nine to the base and effected linkup with the 26th Marine Regiment. The 3d Brigade elements occupied high ground to the east and northeast of the base with no enemy contact. At- this time it became increasingly evident, through lack of contact and the large amounts of new equipment being found indiscriminately abandoned on the battlefield, that the enemy had fled the area rather than face certain defeat. He was totally confused by the swift, bold, many-pronged attacks. Operations continued to the west." Sun Tzu, a famous Chinese warlord 2500 years ago is reputed to have said: Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting. And so it was. I agree with you that I think the 1st Air Cavalry's Operation Pegasus was more important in lifting the siege at Khe Sanh than you do. Go to the link of Breaking the Siege at Khe Sanh below. Peter: LTG Tolson's report said: "To accomplish the mission, the 1st Cavalry Division would be augmented by the following non-divisional units: 1st Marine Regiment, 26th Marine Regiment, III Army of the Republic of Vietnam Airborne Task Force, and the 37th Army of the Republic of Vietnam Ranger Battalion. In all, I would have over 30,000 troops under my direct operational control." He did NOT use all the Marines in the AO. Tolson further reported: "The basic concept of Operation PEGASUS was as follows: The 1st Marine Regiment with two battalions would launch a ground attack west toward Khe Sanh while the 3d Brigade would lead the 1st Cavalry air assault. On D+1 and D+2 all elements would continue to attack west toward Khe Sanh; and, on the following day, the 2d Brigade of the Cavalry would land three battalions southeast of Khe Sanh and attack northwest. The 26th Marine Regiment, which was holding Khe Sanh, would attack south to secure Hill 471. On D+4, the 1st Brigade would air assault just south of Khe Sanh and attack north. The following day the 3d Army of the Republic of Vietnam Airborne Task Force would air assault southwest of Khe Sanh and attack toward Lang Vei Special Forces Camp. Linkup was planned at the end of seven days." My point was not to insult the efforts of the Marines but rather to clarify that 10,000 Marines were not actively involved in Operation Pegasus. Pegasus was an air mobile operation primarily conducted by an AIR CAVALRY DIVISION with the unique capabilities of such a unit–organic helicopters for troop transport, artillery transport, supply transport, and fire support and reconaissance. You make the point that the NVA did not have enough troops to overrun KSFB when the Cav arrived. You may be correct for the reason I've previously stated–they came and went at will. That is why the Cav was necessary to make sure they quit the siege and to open Route 9. The NVA were able to do more than harrass the base after the Cav left as the battle of Dai Do (not that many clicks away) showed. My question to you is that if the siege was over, why did command consider it still in existence and send the 1st Air Cavalry Division to end it? That was one of its specific missions–which it accomplished. If the siege was over before the Cav arrived, why were the Marines still not controlling Route 9 or the surrounding area? And, please, LAPES did not end the siege–it made it more bearable. LAPES did not kill NVA, clear route 9, or end the siege–the 1st Air Cavalry did. Let me be clear about NVA in the area–many fled but many did not and still needed to be cleared out. The Cav did that. LTG Tolson wrote in his report on Operation Pegasus: "At 0800 on 8 April the relief of Khe Sanh was effected and the 1st Cavalry Division became the new landlord. The 3d Brigade airlifted its command post into Khe Sanh and Colonel Campbell assumed the mission of securing the area. This was accomplished after the 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry successfully cleared Highway Nine to the base and effected linkup with the 26th Marine Regiment. The 3d Brigade elements occupied high ground to the east and northeast of the base with no enemy contact. At- this time it became increasingly evident, through lack of contact and the large amounts of new equipment being found indiscriminately abandoned on the battlefield, that the enemy had fled the area rather than face certain defeat. He was totally confused by the swift, bold, many-pronged attacks. Operations continued to the west." Sun Tzu, a famous Chinese warlord 2500 years ago is reputed to have said: Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting. And so it was. I agree with you that I think the 1st Air Cavalry's Operation Pegasus was more important in lifting the siege at Khe Sanh than you do. Go to the link of Breaking the Siege at Khe Sanh below.

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