Shields wasted no time marching his men to Strasburg, then another five miles southwest to Woodstock the next day. Jackson though, was not in the neighborhood.

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Stonewall had brought his command to Mount Jackson, some 37 miles southwest of Woodstock. Between Jackson and Shields were Ashby’s cavalrymen, acting as a very effective screen for the tiny main force. A few of Shields’ own cavalrymen actually reached the Mount Jackson area, but were prevented by Ashby’s men from learning anything about Jackson’s deployment.

Over March 19 and 20, Shields brought his entire division back to Winchester. There, the first of a number of faulty intelligence reports that led eventually to the Battle of Kernstown was delivered. In it, Shields affirmed to Banks that only a small Confederate cavalry contingent remained in the Shenandoah Valley.

Banks couldn’t have been happier. His assignment had proven far easier than expected. He ordered a second division, under Brig. Gen. Alpheus Williams, to leave for McClellan’s command the next day. Banks himself returned to Washington on the 22nd. This left only Shields’ 7,000-man division in the Valley. In addition, he had 750 cavalry and 900 artillerymen with 24 guns. Offhand, that appeared to be plenty.

With the Union confidently pulling out of the Valley, having barely raised a sweat, the stage now belonged to Ashby. He and his troopers had done a magnificent job screening Jackson from Union horsemen and had followed Shields back down the Valley to Winchester. On the evening of the 21st, Ashby sent word to Stonewall that large numbers of enemy soldiers were leaving for the east. Jackson, as incensed as Banks was elated, had his much-vaunted ‘foot cavalry’ marching back northeast by dawn. Besides defending the Valley, his orders had been to tie down excess Union troops that could be used to threaten Richmond. So far, it appeared he had failed. That galled him.

Except for Jackson’s movement, most of the 22nd was quiet. Late in the day, however, Ashby became antsy. Around 4 p.m., he moved up his artillery (Chew’s Battery, Virginia Horse) and began shelling Union skirmishers posted on the southern outskirts of Winchester.

At first, Ashby was successful, forcing the Union troops back toward the town. However, Shields reacted immediately and brought up reinforcements, leading them himself. Skirmishing was heavy, but eventually Ashby was forced back. The shooting died out around sunset, with the Union troops halting about halfway between Winchester and Kernstown.

Shields, however, was out of the fight. He had suffered a broken arm from a shell fragment. As he was leaving the battle, Shields ordered Colonel Nathan Kimball, commander of the First Brigade, to take command of the division. Kimball, also a veteran of the Mexican War, thus became the third commanding officer to lead the division in just three weeks. (The original commander, Brig. Gen. Frederick Lander, had died of illness on March 2.) Shields himself had taken command only two weeks earlier.

Overnight, Shields sent Kimball orders to clear Ashby’s observation force from the area. The wounded commander also sent a brigade north to confuse the enemy, but kept it within marching distance of Winchester.

In the meantime, Ashby delivered another report to Jackson. Based on his observations and some intelligence from misinformed Confederate sympathizers, the cavalry officer told Stonewall that the Union forces before them numbered only 3,000 men in four regiments, a small cavalry contingent and one battery of artillery. And even these were scheduled to return to Harper’s Ferry on the 23rd. Shields’ ruse had worked all too well.

On the 23rd, the fighting resumed early. Kimball’s First Brigade continued to push back Ashby’s cavalry, although it had been reinforced with four companies of early arriving infantry. At this point, the key event of the day occurred. The pressure on Ashby was enormous, and he continued to retreat — all the way to the other side of Kernstown. In so doing, he abandoned the single most important piece of terrain in the area, a small knoll called Pritchard’s Hill just north of the village, which happened to be the only high ground in the area and was also centrally located.

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