While Walker was taking possession of Loudoun Heights, General McLaws was making his way toward the Maryland Heights, directly across the Potomac from Harpers Ferry. And upon McLaws fell the most difficult tactical operation in the effort to capture Harpers Ferry. His mission was twofold. One, he was to occupy the Maryland Heights in order to prevent the Federals at Harpers Ferry from escaping westward into Maryland; and two, he must guard his rear so that the Federals would not attack and defeat him, thereby dividing the Confederate forces north and south of the river.

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McLaws was assigned 10 brigades, and by Friday morning, September 12, he hoped to be in possession of the Maryland Heights and ready to seize Harpers Ferry. After capturing Harpers Ferry, he, too, was to rejoin the main body of Lee’s army at either Sharpsburg or Boonsboro.

With all that in mind, McLaws went out early in the morning of September 10. By the end of his first day’s march, McLaws and his division were just east of Brownsville Gap at South Mountain. Most of the day of the 11th was spent crossing South Mountain, a delay that presented McLaws with a difficult problem. Lee’s plan had called for McLaws to close on Harpers Ferry on the 12th. However, nightfall of the 11th found McLaws in the vicinity of Brownsville, with Harpers Ferry still six miles away.

With McLaws himself leading, the bulk of his force arrived at the Potomac three mites downstream from Harpers Ferry before nightfall on the 12th. Upon his arrival, McLaws ordered Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw and his brigade of South Carolinians, with support from Brig. Gen. William Barksdale’s brigade of Mississippians, to take the road to Solomon’s Gap to the summit of Elk Ridge and occupy the Maryland Heights. As ershaw and his South Carolinians advanced upon the heights, hey came under fire from three companies of Union cavalrymen. Captain James Cuthbert of the 2nd South Carolina Regiment, also commanding a line of Confederate skirmishers, returned fire, and the Yankee troopers retreated with some loss.

At about 6 p.m. that evening Kershaw, Barksdale and their soldiers were struggling along the narrow path to the summit, still lying about a mile ahead, when they encountered a Union defended abatis. After a sharp exchange of gunfire, Kershaw withdrew his skirmishers, deployed his forces in two lines across the mountain, and then encamped for the night.

Renewing their assault early the next morning, Kershaw’s men took less than 20 minutes to overrun the abatis–only to encounter a second one, behind which lay a hastily prepared breastwork of stones and logs defended by 1,200 Union troops. At 6:30, Kershaw mounted a frontal assault while Barksdale led his Mississippians around the Union right flank. Courageously led by Colonel Eliakim Sherrill, a former congressman and militiaman, the Union troops held their own-even the 126th New York, which had only been raised three weeks earlier. After driving back two Rebel assaults, however, Sherrill was struck in the face by a Minie bullet. As he was being carried from the field, Kershaw’s troops advanced again.

Meanwhile, Barksdale’s troops had gotten into position on the Federal flank when a regiment of Mississippi riflemen commanded by Colonel John Fiser fired prematurely at a nest of Union sharpshooters. The Union skirmishers ran, and rumors of a retreat traveled along the Federal line. The green 126th New York troops began to break and run. By the time order was restored, the Maryland Heights had become untenable for the Union forces, the remainder of which were withdrawn, leaving behind three spiked guns. By 4:30, Kershaw and Barksdale had occupied the heights. McLaws, meanwhile, had occupied the village of Sandy Hook, cutting off all northern retreat routes from Harpers Ferry.

McLaws spent the early morning of the 14th cutting a road by which artillery could be pulled up the mountain and placed. He also took the precaution of protecting his rear by deploying some of his forces in strategic locations in Pleasant Valley. Brigadier General Howell Cobb was instructed to take command of Crampton’s Gap, a passage through South Mountain whose existence had just come to McLaws’ attention. Brigadier General Paul J. Semmes was instructed by McLaws to leave a small guard at Solomon’s Gap and send the rest to join Cobb at Crampton’s Gap, while Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson was situated at Weverton. The deployment of those troops proved to be of vital importance later that day, when those at Crampton’s Gap managed to slow the progress of Union Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin’s VI Corps just long enough to prevent his coming to the timely relief of Harpers Ferry, and thus saved Lee’s army from being further divided. By 2 p.m. on the afternoon of the 14th, McLaws had four artillery pieces in position overlooking Bolivar Heights and adjoining Harpers Ferry. McLaws ordered the pieces to open fire on the enemy works.

As McLaws’ artillery began firing, General Walker also ordered his batteries to open fire. The fire was effective, and the Union troops were driven from their works and into the town. Jackson, meanwhile, had resumed his march toward Harpers Ferry on September 13, and early that afternoon he and his division camped in the vicinity of Halltown, about two miles from Bolivar Heights.

At about that time, Maj. Gen. Ambrose Powell Hill (who had been under arrest since the crossing of the Potomac in early September for having been a half-hour late marching his troops) asked a member of Jackson’s staff, Lieutenant Henry Kyd Douglas, to plead Hill’s case before Jackson and ask for reinstatement until the pending action was over, at which time he would report himself under arrest again. According to Douglas, Jackson would not refuse a request to be permitted to fight, and Hill was directed at once to take command of his old division.

Jackson spent Sunday the 14th opening communication with Walker and McLaws and coordinating commands for the attack on Harpers Ferry the next day. By now, Jackson had realized the Federals were trying to advance through the South Mountain gaps to relieve Harpers Ferry–time was of the essence! His work at Harpers Ferry had to be accomplished speedily to enable the Confederate forces at Harpers Ferry to rejoin Lee in Maryland.

At daylight on September 15, accordingly, both McLaws and Walker opened fire on the town itself, while A.P. Hill’s division advanced from the rear upon Bolivar Heights–along the west bank of the Shenandoah River. The Confederate artillery from both the Loudoun and Maryland heights was especially effective because of their elevation. As the Confederate guns dropped their shells on the garrison, several parts of the town itself were subjected to the devastating hail of fire. A distant relative of the author, Mrs. Jessie (Engle) Johnson, was witness to the scene. She later wrote: ‘Several houses in Bolivar had been struck and were burning. Women and children were running in danger of being struck, some fainting, all crying. Major Young’s house next to ours was hit with a bomb which tore up three rooms. Our dining room, in the basement, was full of women and children; we had to keep it dark for a fear of light would draw fire from the mountain on the Maryland side. One cannot portray with words this awful scene.’

The shelling made it difficult for the Union guns to make an effective reply. After about an hour the Union artillery had been all but silenced, and Hill’s infantry was ready to storm the town. As Brig. Gen. William Dorsey Pender then advanced at the head of Hill’s division, the Federal batteries reopened. Hill then moved Captain William J. Pegram’s and Captain Carpenter’s batteries to within 400 yards of the Federal works and poured a furious rain of enfilading fire into the Union positions.

Confusion reigned in the Federal garrison. Union General White had taken over the command just moments before when Colonel Miles fell, mortally wounded. White now realized that defeat was imminent. He gave the order to surrender. And so, about 8 o’clock on the morning of September 15, the Federal garrison at Harpers Ferry capitulated and the Confederates occupied the town.

At little cost to Jackson and his men, the Federals surrendered about 11,500 men, 13,000 stacked arms and 73 pieces of artillery. About 1,300 Union cavalrymen under the command of Colonel Benjamin Franklin Davis were the only Federals to escape. They had left Harpers Ferry during the night of the 14th and had made their way along an unguarded road at the base of Maryland Heights. That outfit, the 8th New York, along with a company from the 12th Illinois and two companies of Rhode Island and Maryland Cavalry, made its way toward Hagerstown and, on the 15th, attacked a part of Longstreet’s wagon train, destroying about 40 wagons, before eventually rejoining the Union Army near Sharpsburg, Md.

The surrender of Harpers Ferry left many questions to be answered by the Union side, the two most important being why had U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Henry Halleck insisted on holding Harpers Ferry against McClellan’s advice, and why had Colonel Miles not concentrated on holding Maryland Heights and putting up a more spirited defense? On September 23, an official inquiry was launched concerning the surrender. The commission found Colonel Miles, General White and Colonel Thomas H. Ford (the Union commander on Maryland Heights) guilty of ‘improper conduct that led to the shameful surrender of Harpers Ferry.’ Since Miles was dead, General White and Colonel Ford were both arrested and dismissed from the service by order of the president.

The fact is, they had been defeated by a master tactician at his best–although Stonewall Jackson still is better known for his Valley campaign than his equally brilliant tactics at Harpers Ferry. The Confederates now were able to consolidate their forces with Lee just in the nick of time to save the Army of Northern Virginia from being split and shattered at the bloody Battle of Antietam on September 17, 1862. Lee’s lieutenants had done the job for him once again by capturing Harpers Ferry with a minimum of Confederate bloodshed, thus keeping open his vital lines of supply and communication.

Today, Harpers Ferry lies still and serene along the Shenandoah and Potomac rivers. The scars of war have healed now, and instead of the thunder of artillery, you are more likely to hear only the excited voices of the tourists as they peer into the past in this little town. If you stand quietly some late summer evening on the steps of St. Peter’s Cathedral, however, and view the two rivers and their respective heights, you may once again return to that late summer of 1862 and in fantasy hear the whistle of shells, the crack of rifles, and the creak of cannons being pulled up those steep slopes. With just a touch of imagination, you can be a quiet witness yourself to this significant action, which came just before the far better known Battle of Antietam.

This article was written by E. Prescott Engle and originally published as Stonewall’s Forgotten Masterpiece in the Augst 1995 issue of Military History magazine. For more great articles be sure to subscribe to Military History magazine today!

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