Meanwhile, Abe’s ships plowed south at 25 knots. Thick clouds gathered rapidly and unleashed a tremendous downpour. The fleet slowed to 18 knots, a high speed for such rain. Japanese crews found it exhausting. Hara thought it the worst rainstorm he had seen in his long career.

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At 10 p.m. on the 12th, the Japanese closed in on Guadalcanal. On Hiei, Abe pored over charts. He needed to pop out of the rain to bombard Guadalcanal, so he ordered a simultaneous 180-degree turn by five destroyers. Two destroyers did not get the word. The order was repeated. The ships made the turn, and the Japanese formation broke up. The van arc of five destroyers was now divided into a section of two and another of three, a poor grouping.

Hara wondered why Abe did not form a battle line. Then, just after 11 p.m., Hara’s lookout shouted, ‘Small island, 60 degrees to port, high mountains dead ahead.’ Hara peered out from his bridge. The rain had just cleared. Ahead lay the mountains of Guadalcanal, barely visible against a dark background of clouds. Hara, shaking with excitement, sounded general quarters.

The Americans had had a busy day, too. Turner, drawing ships from his own convoy escorts, organized a scratch team of five cruisers and eight destroyers to face the Japanese. Turner next had to choose between Rear Adms. Norman Scott and Daniel J. Callaghan, the two senior officers present, to lead Task Force 67.4, the new force. Scott had commanded an American task force at the Battle of Cape Esperance and had won that battle. Callaghan had spent the campaign pushing paper at Noumea. But Callaghan was senior in rank to Scott by 15 days, so Turner gave command to Callaghan, with Scott serving as a supernumerary.

Around 10 p.m. on the 12th, Callaghan’s force moved northwest in single column, the destroyers Cushing, Laffey, Sterett and O’Bannon leading. Next came the light cruiser Atlanta with Admiral Scott aboard, then Callaghan’s flagship, San Francisco. The cruisers Portland, Helena and Juneau followed.

Behind Juneau sailed four more destroyers, the brand-new Fletcher bringing up the rear. Callaghan’s formation was poor. His ships with the newest and best radar systems were in the formation’s center or rear.

Callaghan, an austere and deeply religious officer, apparently planned to cross the Japanese ‘T.’ Or he may have planned to have his rear and van destroyers make flank attacks. Whatever his plan was, he did not tell his subordinates.

Meanwhile, the Japanese formation was a mess. The destroyers Yudachi and Harusame led the way. Behind them was the cruiser Nagara and the battleships. To starboard were the destroyers Inazuma, Akatsuki and Ikazuchi. To port sailed Yukikaze, Amatsukaze and Teruzuki. Behind the force, maneuvering to port were three more destroyers, Asagumo, Murasame and Samidare.

The clock turned over at midnight, and on ships all over Ironbottom Sound watch officers wrote in the new date on their deck logs: Friday, November 13.

A few minutes after 1 a.m., Abe, hearing no contact reports from his scattered ships, ordered his battleships to prepare to shell Henderson Field. Gunners, already at action stations, pulled levers, and Type 3 shells came rumbling and squealing up ammunition hoists into the breeches of the 14-inch guns.

At that moment, the Americans were closing in on a nearly reciprocal course at 20 knots. At 1:24 a.m., Helena’s SG radar picked up the enemy from 13.5 miles (27,100 yards) away, heading right for them. Helena was not the lead ship, Cushing was, and her less efficient SC radar had not picked up Abe’s ships.

Callaghan turned his ships due north. His radar picture was not clear. He called Helena on voice radio to find out what was going on, but the frequency was jammed by ill-disciplined chatter from other ships.

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