On July 2, 1863, the second day of the Battle of Gettysburg, Confederate commander Robert E. Lee ordered Lieutenant General James Longstreet to attack and roll up the Federal left flank. At the same time, Lieutenant General A.P. Hill’s corps would threaten the Union center to prevent Major General George Gordon Meade from reinforcing the Union left and would then continue the attack when Major General Richard Anderson’s brigades, holding the corps’ right, made contact with Longstreet. On the Confederate left, Lee instructed Lieutenant General Richard S. Ewell to make diversionary attacks all along his front and then launch an all-out assault if practicable. If the plan succeeded, the Union army would topple helplessly from the positions it held atop the high ground south of Gettysburg, and the entire Civil War might be won in a day.

During the battle, however, Hill failed to live up to his reputation as a fighting division commander and did not deliver his assault with the power and coherence that Lee had expected. Normally combative, Hill was apparently suffering from diarrhea, stress fatigue or an attack of his recurring prostate affliction during the battle, spending a portion of July 1 restricted to a cot and later acknowledging that he had been unwell. Furthermore, Anderson’s command had previously served in Longstreet’s corps and had only recently been transferred to the newly promoted Hill in the army’s reorganization following the Battle of Chancellorsville. Hill remained unfamiliar with Anderson’s brigades, not yet feeling the same camaraderie with the commanders and men that he experienced with his other divisions. The reorganization would bear bitter fruit before the day was through.

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Considering the circumstances, and the fact that the attack required Hill’s men to go forward swiftly and smoothly once Longstreet had committed his brigades, Lee probably should have placed Anderson under Longstreet’s operational control. The Southern commander, however, knew all too well how sensitive and temperamental the high-strung Hill could be. Not wishing to offend his new corps commander, Lee merely ordered Anderson "to cooperate…in Longstreet’s attack," a vague directive leading to confusion concerning whose command Anderson fought under that day.

Further complicating the situation, Hill and Longstreet distrusted each other, and friction lingered from a disagreement they had had after the Seven Days’ battles the previous summer. Hill had failed to renounce an article glorifying his action at Frayser’s Farm at the expense of other commanders, and that had prompted Longstreet’s anger. The two generals had planned to duel, but Lee interceded and transferred Hill to Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson’s command. The grudge persisted at Gettysburg, and neither officer communicated about how Anderson should advance. Anderson had grown accustomed to Longstreet’s firm hand, detailed supervision and specific instructions. Instead, Hill gave loose directions and left the assault to his division commander’s discretion.

Anderson’s approach to Gettysburg on July 1 was a portent of mishaps to come. By 10 a.m., Anderson had marched his men, organized in five brigades under Brig. Gens. Cadmus Wilcox, Ambrose Wright, Carnot Posey, William Mahone and Colonel David Lang to within a mile of Cashtown, where they waited needlessly for an hour and a half before advancing into the town. Despite hearing the heavy boom of artillery fire at Gettysburg, eight miles to the east, Anderson halted for another hour to receive Hill’s orders. Then he continued along Chambersburg Pike, finally moving by 1 p.m. Upon reaching the battlefield around 4 or 5 p.m., he occupied a reserve position on the Rebel right. Some Southerners have argued–with good reason–that if Anderson had arrived earlier that day and charged forward, Cemetery Hill would have fallen to the Confederates. Colonel Abner Perrin, who commanded a brigade in Maj. Gen. William Dorsey Pender’s division, believed Anderson’s three-hour delay cost the Confederates the entire battle.

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