Early attempted to compensate for his lack of troops by strengthening the defenses and using dismounted cavalry, but with Sheridan’s Federals moving in to his front, Early realized the foolishness of his position and thought it best to withdraw. ‘Having discovered that the position could be flanked,’ Early confessed, ‘I had determined to fall back on the night of the 22nd.’ Unfortunately for Early, he would not be given the option to retreat without battle, for the Federals had realized the extent of Early’s problems by late on the night of the 20th.

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Little Phil realized a frontal attack was unlikely to succeed and would result in heavy casualties no matter the outcome. He recalled that the ‘enemy’s position at Fisher’s Hill was so strong that a direct assault would entail unnecessary destruction of life, and besides, be of doubtful result.’ The initial meeting of Sheridan and his three corps commanders on September 20 provided no immediate decision. One of the initial plans discussed was an attack against the Confederate right flank, and although VI Corps commander Maj. Gen. Horatio Wright and Emory liked the idea, Brig. Gen. George Crook, Sheridan’s West Point roommate and close friend and the head of the VIII Corps, was not keen on the idea.

Captain Russell Hastings, the adjutant of the 23rd Ohio of Crook’s command, had been wounded on the 19th and was in a hospital in Winchester, but after the fight at Fisher’s Hill, he undoubtedly discussed the battle with those who were there and had access to correspondence related to the engagement. Hastings claimed that Crook suggested a turning movement before the evening meeting. A flank attack on the right would be difficult to conceal from a Confederate signal station atop Massanutten, but an assault against the left end of Early’s line held promise, argued Crook. Sheridan adjourned the meeting and then summoned the commanders later that evening to discuss a turning movement of Early’s left.

Crook sometimes lacked confidence in presenting his opinions verbally, especially to superiors. To bolster his argument and hopefully convince Sheridan at the evening meeting, Crook brought his two division commanders, Colonels Rutherford Hayes and Joseph Thoburn, to Sheridan’s headquarters. Hayes, a Harvard-trained lawyer, was brought along to plead Crook’s case. At the’somewhat stormy council of war,’ as Hastings later described it, Hayes made a most eloquent appeal to Sheridan to allow Crook to conduct the turning movement against Early’s left flank — just as Crook had done one day earlier at Winchester. General Wright, however, would not hear of it.

Wright, senior to Crook, believed that conducting the flank attack should be his privilege, as it was the post of honor. Some Union officers in Sheridan’s army already had a negative opinion of Wright and saw him as a glory hound who disliked working in conjunction with other commands. When Wright demanded he be given the post of honor, Hayes apparently lambasted him. ‘It is not a question of post of honor,’ Hayes lectured Wright. ‘The question is, how can the battle be fought, and won, at the least loss of life. The success of the Union Arms must not at this time be jeopardized by personal interests.’ Crook suggested that while his men got into position to flank the enemy, the VI and XIX corps could distract the Confederates by moving against Early’s front. Wright was still doing everything he could to block the flank attack plan, and Sheridan was not yet convinced.

Hayes then reminded Sheridan about the fighting experiences of many of the men in Crook’s command and the nature of the ground over which this flank march of nearly a dozen miles would take place — rocky, rugged and mountainous terrain. A large portion of Crook’s corps had fought much of the Civil War in the mountains of western Virginia and the men were simply more accustomed to this sort of terrain; neither the troops of the VI Corps nor the XIX Corps had such experience. An aged fifer in the 13th West Virginia constantly boasted that he ‘was born on the mountain side [and] have always stood sidewise, with one foot higher than the other ever since I can remember.’

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