Fighting Joe had every intention of pitching into Lee’s army. On April 11, he sent Maj. Gen. Daniel Butterfield, his chief of staff, to the capital with a top-secret letter to Lincoln detailing his plans for the upcoming offensive. Hooker’s scheme was relatively simple: The Union army would close in on the Rebels from two directions; meanwhile, Stoneman’s horsemen would encircle the Confederates and cut off their escape southward. This double envelopment had Maj. Gen. O.O. Howard’s XI Corps, Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum’s XII Corps, and Maj. Gen. George G. Meade’s V Corps, making up Hooker’s right wing, swinging to the right and crossing at Kelly’s Ford. With that, the blue horde would traverse the Rappahannock, then the Rapidan, and march in a southeasterly direction toward the vital crossroads at Chancellorsville.

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While all this was transpiring, Maj. Gen. Darius Couch was to dispatch two divisions from his corps to Banks’ Ford and United States Ford. Hooker wanted Lee’s scouts to assume that these two fords would be the Union crossing points, a logical guess since they closely followed the Union army’s harrowing retreat in January under Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside, later dubbed the Mud March. While Couch’s bluejackets were demonstrating at the fords, the right wing would swoop down on the unsuspecting Rebels.

On the left wing, Hooker sent Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick’s VI Corps, Maj. Gen. John Reynolds’ I Corps, and Brig. Gen. John Gibbon’s division, from Couch’s II Corps, toward the Fredericksburg battleground. There they would cross the Rappahannock and convince Lee that this was the main thrust of the attack. If Lee held, Sedgwick would hurl his 59,000-man wing against him. If Lee withdrew toward Chancellorsville, Sedgwick would follow and carry the works at all hazards, and establish his force on the Telegraph Road.

On April 13, Stoneman’s cavalry corps, less one brigade, rode out of Falmouth to ford the Rappahannock and move on Lee’s rear. Hooker directed Stoneman to concentrate on turning the enemy’s position on his left, and of throwing your command between him and Richmond, and isolating him from his supplies, checking his retreat, and inflicting on him every possible injury which will tend to his discomfiture and defeat….Let your watchword be fight, and let all your orders be fight, fight, fight.

Unfortunately, the Union horsemen did not do much fighting on this day; Mother Nature stepped in. As Stoneman was preparing to cross, a torrential downpour began. For some inexplicable reason, Stoneman had hesitated in crossing. Now the wooden bridge that spanned the Rappahannock was under water, and the nervous brigadier decided to wait out the rain.

Earlier, Colonel Benjamin F. Davis’ brigade had splashed across the river upstream at Sulphur Spring. Angered at Stoneman’s lackadaisical attitude, Davis had no alternative but to order his troopers back across, fearing that otherwise he would be cut off from the remainder of the corps. If Stoneman had demonstrated the same boldness that Davis possessed, his cavalry would have crossed the river and sped on toward Richmond unimpeded.

Hooker, unaware of Stoneman’s delay, reassured Lincoln that, despite the rain, he was sure Stoneman had crossed. Then Fighting Joe learned that Stoneman’s cavalry had never reached the other side of the river and that his artillery was mired in ankle-deep mud. The raid was a disastrous failure.

Infuriated, Hooker quickly revised his plans. On April 28, he issued orders to Stoneman telling him to concentrate his force at Louisa Court House on the Orange & Alexandria Railroad and then strike and destroy the line. Within two days, the Union horsemen had crossed the Rappahannock and were in motion. Apart from a few skirmishes with Rebel troopers, the Northern force was unimpeded as it proceeded to rip up railroad ties, burn depots and cause as much damage as possible. The only exception was Brig. Gen. William Averell’s division, which stopped at Rapidan Station. It seems that Averell thought he was vastly outnumbered and thus ordered his 3,400 troopers to halt. Disgusted, Hooker relieved him of command on May 2.

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