Colonel Steel explained his situation to Selleck at 8 p.m., but Selleck refused permission to withdraw. Steel sent in a second report and stressed the possibility of a disastrous daylight withdrawal if the men did not get out that night. This time Selleck agreed and asked II Corps for permission to withdraw. At 10 p.m., II Corps reluctantly ordered Selleck to conduct a night withdrawal.

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Colonel Steel informed his battalions of the nighttime withdrawal, and everyone was ready shortly after midnight. Kitchen and supply vehicles rolled south. Guides waited at creek beds and trails to keep the main body of infantry on course. The 31st Infantry positioned three rifle companies as a covering force and pulled the bulk of the regiment out at 1:30 a.m. E Company covered the 2nd Battalion as F and G companies pulled south. Light from a half-moon filtered through a slight overcast and helped the soldiers pick their way along trails and roads.

Then at 2:30 a.m., at the moment the covering force itself started to pull out, the Japanese launched a night attack. Intense small-arms fire erupted, and Captain Robert S. Sauer’s E Company was destroyed as a tactical entity. Survivors wandered into friendly lines for the next four days. F Company halted, deployed and repulsed the enemy.

Despite local confusion, the withdrawal succeeded, and Selleck’s force broke contact with the Japanese. All things considered, the delaying force was lucky. The Japanese failed to pursue, and the defenders once again traded space for time. But the delaying action proved costly, especially since more had been expected of Selleck’s men than a single day. Although Selleck’s guns did land the first blows, his artillery regiments lost 11 of 24 guns. There was a lack of determination in several 31st Infantry units. Two company commanders, B Company’s Lieutenant Murphy and I Company’s Captain Stroud, were relieved of command. The 31st Infantry reported only three killed, 18 wounded and 100 missing, with most of the missing from E Company. Those casualties indicate a feeble fight, especially when the Japanese were able to work their way into the main line and scatter two companies. The severity of the Japanese bombardment shook officers and troops alike.

All things considered, the kudos must go to the Japanese invasion force. The battle was a nice example of a numerically inferior, better-trained force evicting a larger, less-well-trained force. The Japanese would display similar tactical skill during the rest of the Bataan campaign.

This written by John W. Whitman and article originally appeared in the October 2001 issue of World War II magazine. For more great articles subscribe to World War II magazine today!

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