Comments on: Backhand Blow: Kharkov 1943

By: Chris

Chris — Sat, 20 Apr 2013 06:46:45 +0000

I am no military expert and only derive some amateur conclusions from the two maps.
My humble opinion is that by stabilizing the front along the Donets & Mius Rivers, von Manstein secured a key advantage for the German defenders. It should be easier to defend against Soviet offensives across rivers which act as formidable barriers. I think there are many examples during WWII that support the idea that rivers tend to favour the defenders. The next substantial river further west was the Dneiper river, but that would have risked a chaotic retreat and give up too much ground. So I think von Manstein's plan was sound, both tactically and strategically.

By: Bobe

Bobe — Mon, 10 Dec 2012 03:29:49 +0000

I admire Manstein as a great german general but it all pales to the german tragedy at USSR with operation BARBAROSSA, with Hitler(a corporal and incompetent and supreme commander at same time?) in charge.I believe if Hitler had not had meddling in military affairs the german armies had a good chance of taking MOSCOW as most generals agreed as strategical objective by 1942 and mostly instead stretching 3 armies in 400 miles(overstretching and being vulnerable to short supplies and sabotage by partisans behind lines) all german thrust would be concentrated in encircling Moscow and the red army would be concentrated there as well, i just read Zhukov's memoirs and by 1942 they still had problems with supplies, and they hardly had enough for defense so there still had chance of a great german victory by 1942. The more i know about WWII the more i discover that Hitler was the principal factor of annihilation of german armies in USSR, his mental and physical state and his character(couldn't debate or accept better opinions, unlike STALIN that was much more intelligent than Hitler and after Stalingrad accepted more advice from Zhukov including the defense not offensive of red army at KURSK). The first major german defeat was at battle of MOSCOW with a red army winter offensive then the Lunatic Hitler commits same mistake again in STALINGRAD no winter clothes and the second red army winter offensive , by then the war was over in the eastern front or any chance of victory evaporated. At KURSK Manstein had only one objective to inflict as much damage to the Red army in order to get some armistice or cease fire, at KURSK germans had a TACTICAL victory but not enough to make any difference in matter of weeks soviets had replaced all that been lost. operation BAGRATION just finished army group center and by now german industry in full war production but too late, Hitler helped the allies more than anything else.

By: William Quinlan Coleman

William Quinlan Coleman — Sat, 08 Dec 2012 00:52:55 +0000

This link is an excellent summary of Mansteins plans in early 43

Forehand and Backhand. Obviously hitler went with forehand

http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/articles/alternativetocitadel.aspx

By: William Quinlan Coleman

William Quinlan Coleman — Sat, 08 Dec 2012 00:44:59 +0000

Oddly, what you blogged about was NOT back hand blow. That was the name given to Mansteins operational spring 43 plans. He did implement some of those ideas in 3rd Kharkov, but the name was attached to his unimplemented spring/summer plans.

I've read about all that I can read Manstein's back hand blow, and I think I've come to the conclusion that he might have gotten away with it a few more times, but the Russians would have wised up to this new operational doctrine and would have eventually overcome it.

You could argue that if Hitler had extended the war by a year and the Russian resource and manpower shortage in 44-45, maybe something happens and Russia brokers a cease fire or peace, but I've always contended that either Russia or the Allies were going to take Berlin,weither this happened in 45 or 46, makes no difference.

But Manstein's elastic defense and thrusts at the trunks are stuff of legend.

By: Planning Post | The Great Wargamer

Planning Post | The Great Wargamer — Mon, 26 Nov 2012 03:09:14 +0000

[...] the story of a fictional single German commander during the Third Battle of Kharkov in 1943, AKA Manstein's Backhand Blow . This is one of my favorite battles in military history as well as IMO the single most impressive [...]

By: bobe

bobe — Mon, 21 May 2012 01:21:45 +0000

Conclusion, Hitler doomed the german army, he was not a general but he was there firing generals and above them and by 1943 ALBERT SPEER one of his inner circle said that HITLER stopped listening to his generals.
So don't blame MANSTEIN, he did the best under the circumstances, we know today that by 1943 Germany should had been on the defensive and slowly withdrawing from USSR, but HITLER just thought of offensive terms, a total lunatic shouldn't been interfering on military affairs at all, on top of that he was then very sick, and when got his amphetamines injections that were doubled(? Morell increased his dose) by 1943 he would feel superhuman and over confident and inflexible.
then we have KURSK not a total disaster but bled the german armies of all resources from fuel to infantry to tanks and airplanes(and mostly pilots) lost, just made easier for the RED ARMY to finish the german armies. Hitler more than anything else helped the soviets.
The generals had no choice against HITLER, if HITLER took their advice maybe the war would have been 2 more years longer for sure.

By: John Merkatatis

John Merkatatis — Tue, 10 Apr 2012 11:59:49 +0000

I am certain that you are aware that you have described the wrong operation,in the wrong place and time for backhand blow.I don't know why you did that but the counter attack that resulted in the re-capture of the city of Kharkov has nothing to do with Manstein's proposal to Hitler regarding German offensive in the East for 1943 with the backhand Blow as an operational concept;that would have resulted in one of the perfect battles of 'offensive return in military history(Erick Mauraise in "Armoured Warfare" for the Swiss Directorate of Military Studies and Military History) and would have caused a standstil in the Eastern front.
Of course Hitler rejected the idea since elastic defence caused nautia to him,but the concept remains with admiration for the person who conceived it and whose military acumen stands above all combatants in WWII.If what you wrote intended to diminish Manstein,because it approaches jingoism,I can only express my regret.

By: ADTS

ADTS — Tue, 27 Mar 2012 18:36:56 +0000

"trapped, like helpless prey, in the talons of their own doctrine."

What a provocative end to your post! Quite frankly, while it probably could not be further removed from high-intensity conflict on the Eastern Front, what the line brought to mind for me is the on-going debate regarding FM 3-24, COIN, etc. (Nagl, "Eating Soup…," and his assertion that the absence of codified or formal in the British Army rendered it more adaptable in Malaya, seems particularly relevant.) I don't know much about German military doctrine in this time period. I am passingly familiar at most with the General Staff system, kriegspiel and war "games," Tante Friede, and so forth. But your post, and (once more) the ending sentence in particular, raises for me the question of: to what extent was the Wehrmacht "governed" by doctrine (at the operational or strategic level, not the Tante Friede level)? Once more, just a passing though, but one which perhaps raises a parallel to contemporary debates.

Thanks
ADTS

By: Derek Weese

Derek Weese — Thu, 22 Mar 2012 22:12:31 +0000

Wouldn't it be valid as well to point out that both militaries were operating under the hand(s) of a totalitarian dictator who both fancied themselves as great military commanders themselves? Certainly both the Wehrmacht and the Red Army stayed true to their doctrine, but I see in more than one instance on the Eastern Front the hand of not just Hitler but also Stalin in operational outcomes. In Stalin's case I think this was actually more acute than it was with Hitler. (I admit, I could be wrong)
Take the long ride behind German lines that allowed Manstein to deliver such an incredible victory. As you mentioned in a previous posting it was not a pleasant experience to confront Stalin with news of failure, and said unpleasantness also oft times led to 'he who is now having had head removed from shoulders' syndrome. Certainly this can be overstated and I don't intend to. I think that the idea that I have heard from some that both the Wehrmacht and the Red Army's Officer Corps' were mindless drones is nonsense. But I do think the dictators played a part in shaping their operations as well as their established doctrine.

By: Bomber

Bomber — Thu, 22 Mar 2012 19:00:54 +0000

Is there a way to not be trapped in a certain way of war? Does it depend on the genius of the individual commander or will countries always be trapped within their doctrine? Could it depend on how long that doctrine has existed?