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Coleman Had the Right Stuff

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I thoroughly enjoyed the article about Bessie Coleman in your November issue (”People and Planes”). Ron Edwards painted a well-focused picture of a determined, enthusiastic and adventurous young person aspiring to become an aviator. Ethnicity and gender notwithstanding, these characteristics are the basic building blocks for all successful aviators.

It should be noted that Frank Peterson, the first and most senior of U.S. Marine Corps African-American aviators, retired with the grade of lieutenant general rather than brigadier general.

Colonel R.E. Fix
U.S. Marine Corps (ret.)
Executive Vice President
OV-10 Bronco Association

MacArthur’s Shortcomings

The summary of John Whitman’s article “Disaster in the Philippines: Air Raid on Cavite” (September 1998) states: “The morning of December 10, 1941, would be to the Americans on Luzon what December 7 had been for those in Hawaii–but without the element of surprise.” Well, of course the December 10 attack was without the element of surprise, since the Japanese had already attacked the Philippine bases on Monday, December 8 (the same “day” as the Pearl Harbor attack only on the other side of the dateline).

Like the December 10 attack, the December 8 attack was also not without warning. First there was the November 26 message from Washington to alert all Pacific commanders that negotiations were at the breaking point. The message specifically stated that the Philippines were regarded as being in imminent danger of attack because Japan was in a drive to gain the sources of much-needed oil in Southeast Asia. Pearl Harbor was considered so geographically remote from the Japanese advance into Southeast Asia that neither Washington nor the local commanders, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short, suspected it would be the target of any initial attack. Indeed, when, at 1330 hours Washington time, Navy Secretary Frank Knox was handed the message that the Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor, he immediately exclaimed, “This must mean the Philippines!” When he phoned President Roosevelt, the latter was equally incredulous that it was not the Philippines. So, while it was the general belief that the Philippines would be the first U.S. target if Japan made an overt attack, MacArthur made no special preparations after receipt of the November 26 war warning. On the other hand, Admiral Thomas C. Hart, the U.S. Asiatic Fleet commander, also based in Manila, described this war warning as “right from the horse’s mouth” and sent his major surface units south and ordered his submarines to spend the days submerged on the bottom of Manila Bay.

A second and certainly more unmistakable warning was the Pearl Harbor attack itself, which occurred at 0130 Manila time. MacArthur’s headquarters received word of the attack a short time later and at 0530 received the presidential directive ordering implementation of the war plan, which included bombing the Japanese air bases on Formosa. However, in spite of the pleas of General Lewis H. Brererton, MacArthur’s Army Air Corps commander, to bomb the Formosa bases with B-17s, no airstrikes were permitted. When the Japanese finally arrived over Luzon at 1130 Manila time, they found most of the U.S. planes on the ground. Loss of three-quarters of the fighter strength (using the figure from another reference) and half the bombers was the result of this 30-minute attack.

It was apparently not the purpose of John Whitman’s article to question command responsibility. Nevertheless, it would have been relevant to at least mention that most of the damage was the result of MacArthur’s inaction after receiving word of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Also, Whitman might have noted that no official blame was ever leveled at MacArthur nor was any investigation ever held of his egregious failure of command, a failure now judged to have been far more costly to our war effort in the Pacific than the Pearl Harbor disaster.

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