Forgetting earlier concerns about his right flank and rear, Hooker ordered Howard to send a full brigade to reinforce Sickles. Brigadier General Francis C. Barlow’s 1st Brigade, 2nd Division, was chosen. The XI Corps’ reserve as well as its largest brigade at close to 3,000 men, Barlow’s brigade held a fortified position north of the pike, where it could effectively counter an attack from either the right or rear. It also supported three batteries of reserve artillery. The order sending the brigade south reached Dowdall’s around 4 p.m. Ignoring the numerous picket warnings, Howard accompanied Barlow south, leaving no one in charge at headquarters.

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After losing the brigade, the XI Corps had 8,600 infantry facing south and only 2,200 facing west. Without infantry support, the reserve artillery’s effectiveness dropped considerably. And since Barlow’s and Birney’s departures had opened a mile-wide gap between the XI and XII corps, Howard’s command was vulnerable to attack from either right or rear, and was isolated from the rest of the Federal army.

During the afternoon, Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart’s Confederate cavalry launched three probing attacks against McLean’s and von Gilsa’s pickets. Farther west, Jackson placed four of Rodes’ five brigades in the first line. Brigadier General Raleigh E. Colston’s division then formed the second line. Major General A.P. Hill’s leading regiments deployed behind Colston. Those in the rear remained on the turnpike and the Brock Road. Rodes deployed skirmishers across a front nearly two miles wide. Behind minor breastworks and a few felled trees, von Gilsa’s regiments heard little of the enemy’s approach through the dense Wilderness.

To the east, at about 4:30 p.m., Slocum ordered Brig. Gen. Alpheus S. Williams’ division to advance southeast in support of Birney. Sickles then directed Whipple’s division to fill the gap between Williams and Birney. Barlow’s brigade, with Howard at the head, reached Birney’s shortly before 5 p.m.

The departure of the additional units further isolated the XI Corps. The gap to the XI Corps’ left near Dowdall’s Tavern now yawned nearly two miles eastward to the Chancellor House. If Jackson succeeded in destroying Howard’s corps, he could drive northeast, seize U.S. Ford and cut off Hooker’s line of retreat.

Shortly before the Confederate attack, Robert Reily and three other 2nd Brigade colonels rode west and discussed the situation with von Gilsa. Resigned to the fact that Devens would not approve any changes, they returned to their commands. Reily called the 75th Ohio together and addressed them. Lieutenant E.R. Monfort remembered Reily’s exact words: ‘Some of us will not see another sun rise. If there is a man in the ranks who is not ready to die for his country, let him come to me and I will give him a pass to the rear, for I want no half-hearted, unwilling soldiers or cowards in the ranks tonight. We need every man to fight the enemy.’ When Reily finished, he told the men to lie down but to keep their guns close by. The colonel remained mounted, his regiment in double columns by division.

As the afternoon passed, a general uneasiness prevailed throughout the 1st Division. When evening arrived, though, officers and men relaxed and the 55th Ohio’s band played popular tunes. Word passed along the line for everybody to eat supper, and some units stacked muskets prior to eating.

The Confederates, however, were not resting. Their first objective was the Talley farm. At 5:15 p.m. Jackson asked Rodes if his troops were ready. After an affirmative reply, Jackson said, ‘You can go forward, then.’ In a few minutes, Confederate pickets struck Federal sharpshooters posted west of von Gilsa’s position. They fired and fell back. Deer and small game ran ahead of the 18,000 Confederate infantrymen. Then bugles rang out in the evening air and a mighty roar of human voices shook the forest as the Confederate onslaught began in earnest. ‘Like a crash of thunder from the clear sky there came a volley of musketry from the right,’ was the way 1st Sgt. Luther B. Mesnard of Company D, 55th Ohio, described it 40 years later. As he looked down the road, Mesnard saw ‘German officers trying to rally the men as everything seemed to be giving way.’

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