America’s Civil War: XI Corps Fight During the Chancellorsville Campaign

 | America's Civil War  | 0 comments  |  Print This Post  |  Email This Post

Hooker tried to minimize the XI Corps’ role in the coming fight by placing the unit on the extreme Federal right. Beginning east of Dowdall’s Tavern, the corps’ battle line ran more than 1 1/2 miles, first along the Orange Plank Road. Where that road turned to the southwest, Howard’s line continued westward along the Orange Turnpike, ending about three-quarters of a mile west of the Talley farm. The ground was thick with stunted trees and undergrowth. Clearings existed only at Dowdall’s, Wilderness Church and Talley’s.

Hooker was upset with what he saw on the morning of May 2. Entrenchments constructed by the XI Corps were ‘decidedly inferior’ to those of the II, V and XII corps. Two miles behind Devens was the Rapidan River, and the intervening gap had been left undefended. To protect his right and rear, Hooker issued orders at 1:55 a.m. to move Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds’ I Corps from below Fredericksburg to Howard’s right. By sunset, the Federals should have a continuous line from the Rappahannock to the Rapidan.

The night before, Robert E. Lee and Lt. Gen. Thomas J. ‘Stonewall’ Jackson had decided to make their own turning movement. If successful, it would place Jackson’s II Corps on the Federal right flank. While Hooker inspected Howard’s corps, Jackson’s troops set out on a 15-mile march across the Army of the Potomac’s front. Through a gap in the trees, scouts from Brig. Gen. David B. Birney’s III Corps division spied Confederate infantry marching west past Catherine Furnace, and at 8 a.m., Birney sent couriers to alert Hooker and Maj. Gen. Daniel Sickles, the III Corps commander, of the development.

Completing the inspection before 9 a.m., Hooker returned to his headquarters at the Chancellor House, where he was informed of the enemy column moving past Catherine Furnace. Hooker considered the information from Birney important enough to include in his 9:30 a.m. dispatch to Howard and ordered Sickles to make a reconnaissance to the south and east.

Major General Carl Schurz, the XI Corps’ 3rd Division commander, received Hooker’s dispatch at Dowdall’s Tavern, Howard’s headquarters. In it was the’suggestion’ that the corps be ready for an attack from the west. Around 10 a.m., Schurz recommended that they pull back to Wilderness Church and reposition Devens’ 1st Division, on the corps’ right flank, to face west. Howard disagreed. Of his own accord, Schurz changed the front of four of his regiments from south to west.

Devens, like his corps commander, took no action. On the 1st Division’s right was Colonel Leopold von Gilsa’s 1st Brigade. Only two regiments faced west, the 54th New York and the 153rd Pennsylvania. The units had cut some tree limbs to form meager abatis, but neither unit had any substantial protection. Their two sister regiments, the 41st and 45th New York, faced south along the road. The New York units were almost exclusively German.

Next in line, McLean’s 2nd Brigade contained three veteran Ohio regiments–the 25th, 55th and 75th–plus two rookie units–the 107th Ohio and 17th Connecticut. Except for the 107th, a predominantly German regiment, nearly all the brigade’s officers and enlisted men were U.S. citizens. Three regiments were on the turnpike, the 17th Connecticut, 55th and 107th Ohio. Supporting von Gilsa’s brigade, the 75th Ohio was positioned 700 yards to the right rear. The 25th Ohio filled a similar reserve role for McLean. All the regiments faced south. To their left was Schurz’s division.

An hour after Hooker’s departure that morning, Devens and several 2nd Brigade officers stood on the crest of a hill near Talley’s and watched enemy infantry, two miles to the south, marching west. McLean was told of the movement, and Devens sent word to corps headquarters. At Dowdall’s, Howard included the sighting in a 10:50 a.m. dispatch to Hooker, reporting that ‘I am taking measures to resist an attack from the west.’ Devens’ staffers were concerned about an attack, but the general did not think the ground held by his division was the enemy’s objective.

Help HistoryNet by bookmarking to

Tags: 19th Century, America's Civil War, American Civil War, Historical Conflicts, Historical Figures

You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a comment, or trackback from your own site.