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America’s Civil War: Robert E. Lee and James Longstreet at Odds at GettysburgMilitary History | 4 comments | Print This Post | Email This Post
Lee and Stonewall Jackson became enshrined as Southern heroes, above blame, and Longstreet — for too many — the scapegoat. After the war, the former I Corps commander became an apostate in his native region: a former Confederate who had joined the Republican Party and accepted federal jobs! Politics and personal animosity fed the controversy, and Longstreet became known as the man who lost the war for the South. Subscribe Today
Gettysburg became the cornerstone of his critic’s case. Had he done his duty, had he not sulked, had he not stalled, Lee would have achieved victory on July 2. To be sure, Gettysburg was not one of Longstreet’s better performances of the war — his conduct on the morning of the 2nd warrants criticism. But his failings were not isolated — the confederate effort at Gettysburg revealed an army plagued with command problems and an extended, five-mile-long battle line. Lee’s incomparable infantry could not overcome those crippling handicaps.
E. Porter Alexander, who became perhaps the Confederate Army’s most astute chronicler after the war, wrote that Lee ‘never paid his soldiers a higher compliment than in what he gave them to do’ at Gettysburg. But Longstreet was correct in his judgment, Alexander argued, because ‘the Union position could never have been successfully assaulted.’ As for Longstreet’s objections to Lee’s attack plan, Alexander explained in a private letter, ‘It is true that he obeyed reluctantly at Gettysburg, on the 2nd & on the 3rd, but it must be admitted that his judgment in both matters was sound & he owed it to Lee to be reluctant, for failure was inevitable do it soon, or do it late, either day.’
James Longstreet died in 1904, a man still vilified by former friends and comrades. Before his death, Longstreet told one of his opponents at Gettysburg, Union General Daniel Sickles, that the battle ‘was the sorest and saddest reflection of my life for many years.’ He grieved not for what might have been during those three July days, but what had been — the terrible price that he had foreseen.
This article was written by Jeffry Wert and originally published in the August 1994 issue of Military History.
For more great articles be sure to subscribe to Military History magazine today! Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6Help HistoryNet by bookmarking to
            Tags: 19th Century, American Civil War, Historical Conflicts, Historical Figures
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4 Comments to “America’s Civil War: Robert E. Lee and James Longstreet at Odds at Gettysburg”
civil war is cool
By brian on Mar 30, 2009 at 9:41 am
I grew up near Gettysburg and have visited the field many times as well as reading many accounts of the battle. Both Lee and Longstreet have points in their favor as to who had a better strategy. Lee knew the south needed a quick victory for numerous reasons. First, to secure recognition from the Europeans to give the southern cause credibility. Also to defeat the army of northern Virginia and drive to Washington where he was to deliver a letter from Jefferson Davis to sue for peace. He couldn’t afford a long, drawn out campaign against a much larger foe. Longstreet on the other hand had a more sound strategy of forcing the enemy to attack on ground of their choosing since they were fighting in unknown territory and being, as usual, out numbered. He knew the offensive tactics would drain the south of men that couldn’t be replaced. I also believe that Lee had agreed to this before they left
Virginia. He should have been reprimanded for his performance at certain stages of the battle but he seemed to be stalling hoping Lee would see the light.
There is no way the rebels could have dislodged Meade from those heights
with his strong interior lines and natural fortifications he had. Pickett’s Charge was a disaster waiting to happen and Longstreet’s assesment of
it’s failure was a no brainer. So all in all, I believe Longstreet was right and it was Lee’s worst battle plan of the war. The question I’ve always had is this -
Even if Pickett’s Charge had broken through how could they have sustained the advantage with no back up and almost 50% casualties? Who was going to drive on to Washington? A doomed strategy by Lee.
By Doug Malott on Jun 17, 2009 at 12:18 pm
One cannot succeed in the long term if you do not survive the short term. That is the case at Gettysburg. Any extended strategy that Lee may have harbored became useless when he destroyed his army on day 3.
Cemetery Ridge and the Round Tops were unassailable after Sykes and Sedgwick secured the Federal left flank.
Longstreet was correct in his tactical assessment of the CSA and USA positions. Lee’s arrogance and emotion took command of the situation.
Quite simply, Lee did at Gettysburg what Burnside did at Fredericksburg. Cemetery Ridge vs. Marye’s Heights – no difference. Except that Southern mythology sanctified Lee and vilified Longstreet. It seems to me that Lee ought to be remembered with the minimal reverence afforded Burnside and his ilk.
By Mike Spangler on Jun 18, 2009 at 9:52 pm
Mr. Spangler must be joking when he says that “Lee ought to be remembered with the minimal reverence afforded Burnside and his ilk.” Burnside had not 1/10th the skill and courage of R.E. Lee on or off the battlefield. While I believe that Longstreet’s assessment of the situation at Gettysburg after the first day was essentially correct, Lee had several good reasons to try and break the Union position on Cemetary Ridge and not engage in a drawn out campaign in Union territory. Lee was lacking General Stuart and therefore was not aware of the size or disposition of the federal army. He had no line of supply and could not afford to sit by and wait out General Meade. Lee was forced to either try to get around the Union army and position his army between Meade and Washington, as Longstreet suggested or to attack. Burnside labored under none of these limitations. Burnside did not have to make the doomed attack on Mayre’s Heights. He has a full calvary, he had a supply line to Washington and could have waited until conditions were either more favorable or until a better plan could be devised. Comparing Lee and Burnside as having comparable skill on the field of battle is simply ridiculous.
By Bob Challenger on Sep 8, 2009 at 3:56 pm