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America's Civil War: Robert E. Lee and James Longstreet at Odds at Gettysburg

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It had not been enough, however. Against successive waves of Federal units, the Rebels had finally stalled. When other Confederate divisions did not continue the en echelon assaults as Lee had directed, Meade's army still clung to Cemetery Ridge and Little Round Top. Lee watched the terrible struggle and concluded that if his commanders could coordinate their assaults, the Yankees could not withstand the thrusts. That night Lee ordered a renewal of the offensive for daylight, Friday, July 3.

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Before sunrise Lee rode to Longstreet's position, near the position known ever since as the Peach Orchard, where he expected to find preparations for the assault underway. When he did not find the men forming, Lee sought Longstreet and an explanation.

'General,' Longstreet said in welcome, 'I have had my scouts out all night, and I find that you still have an excellent opportunity to move around to the right of Meade's army and maneuver him into attacking us.'

Lee clearly was angry; he had heard enough. He pointed toward Cemetery Ridge and said, 'The enemy is there, and I am going to strike him.'

As Longstreet saw the situation, Lee wanted too much. Longstreet said that a direct assault on the Federal position was doomed — that it would mean 'the sacrifice of my men.' As Longstreet recalled later: 'I felt then that it was my duty to express my convictions. I said, 'General, I have been a soldier all my life. I have been with soldiers engaged in fights by couples, by squads, companies, regiments, divisions, and armies, and should know, as well as anyone, what soldiers can do. It is my opinion that no fifteen thousand men ever arranged for battle can take that position."

The exchange was a defining moment between the two generals — the culmination of three days of disagreement over the army's tactics. From the afternoon of the 1st, Longstreet had seen Lee taking risks, willing to accept casualties while striking the enemy. Now, Lee was asking even more, a frontal assault with no chance of success, with an enormous loss of life a certainty. The idea went against the basic beliefs and characteristics of Longstreet's generalship.

'Never was I so depressed,' Longstreet wrote afterward of this day. But Lee's orders stood, and preparations proceeded throughout the morning. Longstreet had responsibility for the assault force comprising Maj. Gen. George E. Pickett's three brigades and six brigades from A.P. Hill's corps.

Following a thunderous artillery bombardment, the brave Pickett rode to Longstreet for the order to advance. The senior officer was so overcome with emotion that he could not speak — he only nodded his head. When Pickett turned away, Longstreet went to Alexander's batteries and there told the artillery officer: 'I don't want to make this attack. I believe it will fail — I would not make it even now, but the General Lee has ordered it & expects it.'

Longstreet then watched as the Confederate ranks marched toward the ridge — and to the slaughter he had predicted. Union cannon crews and infantrymen blasted apart the Southern units in a gale of death. As the remnants of the brigades stumbled back to Seminary Ridge, Longstreet saw that 'Pickett's division was gone.' Nearby, Lee rode among the survivors, remarking to a general, 'All this has been my fault — it is I that have lost this fight.'

Pickett's Charge, as it came to be called, was a dramatic finale to a battle rich in drama. Lee's army began its retreat the next day and within a fortnight had returned to safety in Virginia. Before long, examination of Gettysburg began; and it will, in all likelihood, continue as long as Americans seek explanations of the past. Part of the nation's soul lay in such places as Culp's Hill, Cemetery Hill, Little Round Top, the Wheat Field, the Valley of Death, Devil's Den, Trostle's Woods and Cemetery Ridge. After Appomattox and the end of the Confederacy two years later, Southerners fashioned their own interpretation of the conflict, and Gettysburg became the tantalizing and bitter 'if' of the war.

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  1. 4 Comments to “America's Civil War: Robert E. Lee and James Longstreet at Odds at Gettysburg”

  2. civil war is cool

    By brian on Mar 30, 2009 at 9:41 am

  3. I grew up near Gettysburg and have visited the field many times as well as reading many accounts of the battle. Both Lee and Longstreet have points in their favor as to who had a better strategy. Lee knew the south needed a quick victory for numerous reasons. First, to secure recognition from the Europeans to give the southern cause credibility. Also to defeat the army of northern Virginia and drive to Washington where he was to deliver a letter from Jefferson Davis to sue for peace. He couldn't afford a long, drawn out campaign against a much larger foe. Longstreet on the other hand had a more sound strategy of forcing the enemy to attack on ground of their choosing since they were fighting in unknown territory and being, as usual, out numbered. He knew the offensive tactics would drain the south of men that couldn't be replaced. I also believe that Lee had agreed to this before they left
    Virginia. He should have been reprimanded for his performance at certain stages of the battle but he seemed to be stalling hoping Lee would see the light.
    There is no way the rebels could have dislodged Meade from those heights
    with his strong interior lines and natural fortifications he had. Pickett's Charge was a disaster waiting to happen and Longstreet's assesment of
    it's failure was a no brainer. So all in all, I believe Longstreet was right and it was Lee's worst battle plan of the war. The question I've always had is this -
    Even if Pickett's Charge had broken through how could they have sustained the advantage with no back up and almost 50% casualties? Who was going to drive on to Washington? A doomed strategy by Lee.

    By Doug Malott on Jun 17, 2009 at 12:18 pm

  4. One cannot succeed in the long term if you do not survive the short term. That is the case at Gettysburg. Any extended strategy that Lee may have harbored became useless when he destroyed his army on day 3.

    Cemetery Ridge and the Round Tops were unassailable after Sykes and Sedgwick secured the Federal left flank.

    Longstreet was correct in his tactical assessment of the CSA and USA positions. Lee's arrogance and emotion took command of the situation.

    Quite simply, Lee did at Gettysburg what Burnside did at Fredericksburg. Cemetery Ridge vs. Marye's Heights – no difference. Except that Southern mythology sanctified Lee and vilified Longstreet. It seems to me that Lee ought to be remembered with the minimal reverence afforded Burnside and his ilk.

    By Mike Spangler on Jun 18, 2009 at 9:52 pm

  5. Mr. Spangler must be joking when he says that "Lee ought to be remembered with the minimal reverence afforded Burnside and his ilk." Burnside had not 1/10th the skill and courage of R.E. Lee on or off the battlefield. While I believe that Longstreet's assessment of the situation at Gettysburg after the first day was essentially correct, Lee had several good reasons to try and break the Union position on Cemetary Ridge and not engage in a drawn out campaign in Union territory. Lee was lacking General Stuart and therefore was not aware of the size or disposition of the federal army. He had no line of supply and could not afford to sit by and wait out General Meade. Lee was forced to either try to get around the Union army and position his army between Meade and Washington, as Longstreet suggested or to attack. Burnside labored under none of these limitations. Burnside did not have to make the doomed attack on Mayre's Heights. He has a full calvary, he had a supply line to Washington and could have waited until conditions were either more favorable or until a better plan could be devised. Comparing Lee and Burnside as having comparable skill on the field of battle is simply ridiculous.

    By Bob Challenger on Sep 8, 2009 at 3:56 pm

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