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America’s Civil War: Robert E. Lee and James Longstreet at Odds at GettysburgMilitary History | 4 comments | Print This Post | Email This Post
Before they departed, all the Rebels knew that a collision with the enemy was inevitable. It came on Wednesday, July 1, as both armies followed the roads to Gettysburg. But Lee neither expected nor wanted a battle on this day, issuing orders against bringing on a general engagement. Subscribe Today
For a week, Lee had heard nothing from his cavalry commander, Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart, about the whereabouts of George Meade’s units, and the lack of any report from Stuart worried him. It was one of Longstreet’s spies who carried the initial news to Lee that the Federals also had crossed the Potomac. While Lee endeavored to reconcentrate his corps, his Confederate units collided with Union troops outside Gettysburg, precipitating a battle.
Longstreet was riding with Lee when the two Confederate commanders heard the sounds of artillery in the direction of Gettysburg. Lee spurred ahead while Longstreet oversaw the movement of Southern units toward the village. The Confederate commander was ‘a blinded giant,’ according to historian Douglas Southall Freeman, as he rode toward the ominous rumble. He arrived west of Gettysburg in time to give his consent to an assault by troops belonging to Hill and Ewell that routed two Union corps, driving the Federals through Gettysburg’s streets to Cemetery Hill, south of the village. Although Lee would have preferred to offer battle only after his divisions had been reunited, the day’s outcome brought both a victory and the tactical initiative.
Longstreet joined Lee on Seminary Ridge west of Gettysburg about 5 o’clock in the afternoon. When he arrived, Lee was busy, so Longstreet examined through field glasses the Federal position to the south and east. When Lee finished, Longstreet turned to him and remarked: ‘We could not call the enemy to position better suited to our plans. All that we have to do is file around his left and secure good ground between him and his capital.’
Lee reacted with some anger to Longstreet’s advice and, jabbing a fist toward Cemetery Ridge, replied, ‘If the enemy is there tomorrow, we must attack him.’
‘If he is there,’ Longstreet shot back, ‘it will be because he is anxious that we should attack him — a good reason, in my judgment, for not doing so.’
Neither man said anything else, and as Longstreet admitted later, he ‘was not a little surprised’ at his commander’s reaction, his apparent ‘impatience.’
Longstreet wrote McLaws about how surprised he was to find ‘all of our previously arranged plans to [be] unexpectedly changed and why I might wish and hope to get the Gen. to consider our former arrangements.’ It looked like another Chancellorsville, perhaps another uphill assault as at Malvern Hill, to Longstreet, and he thought it a mistake, a dismissal of their previous discussions.
In Lee’s defense, his subordinate’s proposal made little tactical sense at the time. Lee knew only that two corps of Meade’s army were on the field, but what of the other five? Where was Meade’s flank? Without Stuart’s cavalry, Lee could not countenance a vague march beyond an unknown flank. He had not wanted this day’s fight, but a battle had occurred, his units had won, and the enemy was there. ‘A battle thus became, in a measure, unavoidable,’ Lee stated in his report, and ‘in view of the valuable results that would ensue from the defeat of the army of General Meade, it was thought advisable to renew the attack.’
Lee and Longstreet soon parted — Lee to visit Richard Ewell on the army’s left; Longstreet to his camp along Chambersburg Pike. Lee’s visit with Ewell resulted in little regarding the next day’s plans. The commanding general was committed to be offensive, but the details of the operation would have to be completed with another morning’s sun.
Before dawn of July 2, Longstreet rejoined Lee on Seminary Ridge. The I Corps commander had not been able to hide from his staff at the previous evening’s meal his disagreement with Lee’s decision to renew attacks. Now, for a second time, Longstreet repeated his proposal for a broad turning movement around Meade’s left flank. As he had on the afternoon of the 1st, Lee rejected it. He responded by informing Longstreet that he would need the services of the divisions headed by Maj. Gens. Lafayette McLaws and John Bell Hood. Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6Help HistoryNet by bookmarking to
            Tags: 19th Century, American Civil War, Historical Conflicts, Historical Figures
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4 Comments to “America’s Civil War: Robert E. Lee and James Longstreet at Odds at Gettysburg”
civil war is cool
By brian on Mar 30, 2009 at 9:41 am
I grew up near Gettysburg and have visited the field many times as well as reading many accounts of the battle. Both Lee and Longstreet have points in their favor as to who had a better strategy. Lee knew the south needed a quick victory for numerous reasons. First, to secure recognition from the Europeans to give the southern cause credibility. Also to defeat the army of northern Virginia and drive to Washington where he was to deliver a letter from Jefferson Davis to sue for peace. He couldn’t afford a long, drawn out campaign against a much larger foe. Longstreet on the other hand had a more sound strategy of forcing the enemy to attack on ground of their choosing since they were fighting in unknown territory and being, as usual, out numbered. He knew the offensive tactics would drain the south of men that couldn’t be replaced. I also believe that Lee had agreed to this before they left
Virginia. He should have been reprimanded for his performance at certain stages of the battle but he seemed to be stalling hoping Lee would see the light.
There is no way the rebels could have dislodged Meade from those heights
with his strong interior lines and natural fortifications he had. Pickett’s Charge was a disaster waiting to happen and Longstreet’s assesment of
it’s failure was a no brainer. So all in all, I believe Longstreet was right and it was Lee’s worst battle plan of the war. The question I’ve always had is this -
Even if Pickett’s Charge had broken through how could they have sustained the advantage with no back up and almost 50% casualties? Who was going to drive on to Washington? A doomed strategy by Lee.
By Doug Malott on Jun 17, 2009 at 12:18 pm
One cannot succeed in the long term if you do not survive the short term. That is the case at Gettysburg. Any extended strategy that Lee may have harbored became useless when he destroyed his army on day 3.
Cemetery Ridge and the Round Tops were unassailable after Sykes and Sedgwick secured the Federal left flank.
Longstreet was correct in his tactical assessment of the CSA and USA positions. Lee’s arrogance and emotion took command of the situation.
Quite simply, Lee did at Gettysburg what Burnside did at Fredericksburg. Cemetery Ridge vs. Marye’s Heights – no difference. Except that Southern mythology sanctified Lee and vilified Longstreet. It seems to me that Lee ought to be remembered with the minimal reverence afforded Burnside and his ilk.
By Mike Spangler on Jun 18, 2009 at 9:52 pm
Mr. Spangler must be joking when he says that “Lee ought to be remembered with the minimal reverence afforded Burnside and his ilk.” Burnside had not 1/10th the skill and courage of R.E. Lee on or off the battlefield. While I believe that Longstreet’s assessment of the situation at Gettysburg after the first day was essentially correct, Lee had several good reasons to try and break the Union position on Cemetary Ridge and not engage in a drawn out campaign in Union territory. Lee was lacking General Stuart and therefore was not aware of the size or disposition of the federal army. He had no line of supply and could not afford to sit by and wait out General Meade. Lee was forced to either try to get around the Union army and position his army between Meade and Washington, as Longstreet suggested or to attack. Burnside labored under none of these limitations. Burnside did not have to make the doomed attack on Mayre’s Heights. He has a full calvary, he had a supply line to Washington and could have waited until conditions were either more favorable or until a better plan could be devised. Comparing Lee and Burnside as having comparable skill on the field of battle is simply ridiculous.
By Bob Challenger on Sep 8, 2009 at 3:56 pm