Casualty statistics tell the tale. Of two thousand German airborne troops (22nd Infantry Division–Airlanding) assigned to capture The Hague in the Netherlands on May 10, 1940, 40 percent of the officers and 28 percent of the men were killed. That same day, the Fallschirm­jäger that attacked the Belgian fortress of Eban Emael suffered 30 percent casualties. Almost a year later, German paratroopers suffered 58 percent casualties during their invasion of Crete, with a full quarter of the participants killed. “We paid dearly for our victory,” Adolf Strauch concluded. “Our victory was no victory.”

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The British parachute commando action at Tragino, Italy, cost them the entire raiding force. Soviet paratroopers suffered 71 percent casualties during their desperate battles around Vyazma and Moscow from January to March 1942. The German Waffen SS Paratroop Battalion suffered 62 percent casualties in its raid on Tito’s headquarters in Yugoslavia in May 1944, and approximately 80 percent of the British 1st Airborne Division was lost during Operation Market-Garden in September of that same year. The 82nd Airborne Division incurred 27 percent casualties in Sicily and 46 percent in Normandy.

In the overall American experience of World War II, over 30 percent of all airborne personnel became casualties. This compares to only 10 percent among regu­lar infantry formations.

That the airborne battlefield exacts a higher price can be easily understood. On this battleground the situation is often unclear. A paratrooper frequently finds himself totally alone, and is never fully sure who or how many will actually arrive on the objective in time to assist in the battle. Only an exceptional combat soldier survives in these ambiguous, hostile surroundings. Neither rank nor position hold privilege.

For example, during the assault on Sicily, many gliders crashed into the Mediterranean Sea. One survivor clinging to the wreckage of his stricken aircraft was British Maj. Gen. George F. Hopkinson, commander of the 1st Airborne Division. Similarly, during the invasion of Normandy, the U.S. 1st Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment, was not only badly scattered but its commanding officer was killed, the battalion second-in-command was captured, and all four company commanders were missing. “The scattering had an operating influence on the whole battle,” disclosed paratroop veteran Dan Hartigan. “We lost more than fifty percent of our officers on D-Day, fifteen of twenty-seven.”

Required to act independently, all airborne soldiers had to be prepared to carry on the mission by themselves. “When its [airborne division] people hit the ground,” declared General Ridgway, “they are individuals, and a two-star general and a Pfc are on exactly the same basis.” Elaborating, he stressed the complexity of operating alone: “You have no communications whatsoever for some little time, particularly when you have jumped at night. You don’t know where you are. You don’t know who’s around you, friend or foe.”

Without question, the airborne battlefield required an aggressive individual with courage, initiative, and tenacity, as well as mental alertness and exemplary combat skills. Paratroopers had to be capable of adapting to unforeseen situations, and above all else they had to be self-reliant.

To identify these individuals, airborne forces used special selection processes and rigorous training methods. In the end, the formidable entrance requirement and grueling training designed to weed out all but the fittest and most aggressive created a distinct airborne mentality: no mission too daunting, no challenge too great.

In summary, Brigadier James Hill simply described parachute troops as the best fighting material in the world. Hill stated that he believed “the parachutists have shown themselves magnificent infantry, pre-eminent in physique and steadiness of nerve, born guerrilla fighters, mobile and tireless, tremendous marchers, and of an undefeated spirit.” Even George C. Marshall, the American army chief of staff, declared, “The courage and dash of airborne troops has become a by-word and is a great inspiration to all others.”

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