Although conservative military staff officers and commanders were not as easily convinced, directives from their seniors, as well as an evolution in the conceptualization of possible airborne roles, also prompted the change in Allied thought. Until 1941, conventional thinking gave parachute troops two rudimentary primary functions. First were major operations that employed paratroopers to capture a specific target of vital importance. The second function entailed dropping small numbers of airborne soldiers to conduct raids against headquarters, infrastructure, or small targets of tactical, operational, or strategic value. In many circles, airborne operations were considered almost suicide missions.

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By 1942, the emphasis on airborne operations as a tactical-level instrument disappeared. In fact, the pendulum had swung to the opposite extreme. The U.S. War Department’s 1942 book of strategy clearly stated “…one cannot possibly hope to succeed in landing operations unless one can be assured of the cooperation of parachutists on a scale hitherto undreamed of.” Paratroopers were now regarded “as the pivot of success of the entire operation.”

By 1943, the Allies assigned paratroopers three major functions. The first emphasized ousting the Axis from occupied territory. Airborne troops were responsible for assisting conventional forces in joint operations by attacking the enemy rear and assisting with the breakthrough of the main forces. In this capacity, they were also expected to delay enemy reserves by holding defiles between them and the bridgeheads, or conversely to destroy any enemy attempting to withdraw. In addition, paratroops were also assigned the possible tasks of capturing enemy airfields, creating diversions, and capturing or destroying belligerent headquarters, to paralyze the enemy’s capability of providing a cohesive defense.

“In almost every case,” explained Maj. Gen. Richard Gale, while commanding the British 6th Airborne Division, “Airborne Forces will lead the way and be the spearhead of the attack.” Elaborating, he explained, “The sort of tasks you may have to do are: capture a position in the rear of the enemy, cut his communications, and isolate him from his reinforcements; attack the enemy in the rear, while our main forces attack his front; capture airfields in enemy country; assist sea or river crossings by making a bridgehead; [and/or] raid special objectives.”

The second major function assigned to paratroopers was to work independently. Borrowing from the German model, strategists envisioned airborne forces capturing islands or areas either not strongly defended or not capable of being reinforced, as well as positions that could undermine the enemy’s stature internationally and domestically and possibly destroy public morale. Moreover, this could tie down enemy reserves that might be used elsewhere. In addition, paratroopers working independently might seize vital installations, such as oil refineries and centers of government. Paratroopers were also given the possible task of assisting guerrilla forces by providing a nucleus of trained soldiers. In essence, paratroop units were to act independently to pin down enemy resources or require the enemy to invest a large amount of equipment and manpower to ensure the security of his rear areas.

The third paratrooper function was harassment. Strategists envisioned airborne troops operating in small numbers, often at a great distance from the area of major operations. Paratroopers within this function would be assigned the tasks of harassing communications and destroying aircraft, transport, signal stations, railway trains, locks, bridges, and factories. In addition, they would also be responsible for destroying enemy fuel, supplies, and equipment, as well as causing panic among civilians.

Despite the growth of paratroopers and their widespread public appeal, conventional military leaders did not warmly accept establishing distinct airborne units and formations. Airborne detractors continued to argue that parachuting was just another means to the battlefield. Some felt there was no need to create a special airborne force. When the need for parachute troops arose, they felt designated regular units could easily be trained.

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