Lincoln's calculation paid off. Atlanta fell on Septem­ber 1, and Northern opinion concerning the war turned on a dime. Two months later Lincoln won a smashing electoral victory, in significant measure due to the generalship of his insubordinate commander in the West. Ironically, this bitterly prejudiced general served the ultimately victorious antislavery war policy of the Lincoln administration.

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The week after claiming he was too rushed to think about acquiescing to Lincoln's order, Sherman found time to reaffirm his defiant political sentiments in a letter to John A. Spooner, recruitment agent for black soldiers in Massachusetts. Sherman told Spooner to share the letter with other state agents, and sent copies to many of his military subordinates.

Sherman wrote Spooner that he opposed the policy because "the ne­gro is in a transition state, and not the equal of the white man….I pre­fer some negroes as pioneers, cooks and servants, others gradually to experiment in the art of the soldier [with] the duties of local garri­sons," and none at all with his frontline forces. When news of the correspondence spread, he wrote to a friend: "I never thought my nigger letter would get into the press….I lay low. I like niggers well enough as niggers, but when fools and idiots try and make niggers better than ourselves, I have an opinion."

In the coming weeks, Sherman remained furious about black recruitment, often referring to the dangers of enlisting "niggers and vagabonds," who would prove to be worthless, cowardly, slothful "trash." When Atlanta fell, Sherman wrote to Halleck, "I hope anything I said or done will not be construed unfriendly to Mr. Lincoln or Stanton." He had never intended his Spooner letter for publication, he professed, but now he urged Lincoln, through Halleck, to drop the policy, saying, "I am honest in my belief that it is not fair to our men to count negroes as equals." Yes, a negro might be "as good as a white man to stop a bullet [but] a sand bag is better." Black troops were incapable, he believed, of skirmishing, improvising roads and creating spontaneous flanking movements.

Many in Washington began writing Sherman that he was both pigheaded and wrong in his opinions, including key allies such as Halleck, Samuel Chase and his own brother. After Sherman's army had taken Savannah, Ga., at the end of his March to the Sea, Edwin Stanton came down by cutter to impose on Sherman a regiment of black troops that he had brought with him. Sherman, however, disarmed the black soldiers and gave them spades. His white troops rioted against the newcomers, killing at least three and reminding them that they had no place in this army, which remained lily-white until war's end.

In what is perhaps the greatest irony of all, at Stanton's urging, Sherman issued his Special Field Orders No. 15, which gave former slaves 40 acres of land, taken from the plantations of Confederates who had fled. This radical act seemed to ab­solve Sherman of his racist reputation while providing an alternative for the blacks who wanted to fight in his army. It was perhaps the single most dra­matic act in race relations during the Civil War, and William T. Sherman, Negrophobe, was its effective father.

Sherman relished exercising control of his army's racial composition, and he enjoyed fighting the admin­istra­tion over issues of racial equality. Lincoln managed to keep his cool. Sherman, he knew, was of more use as head of the Union army in the West than as an ex-commander.

This all exemplifies the often breathtakingly high level of the political struggle during this antislavery war, not just against the Confederacy but also within the Union, even the Army. Lincoln did not feel unconstrained enough to assert his authority as commander in chief to impose policy on this wildest of generals and fire him when he disobeyed—not just once, but over years. Other generals, particularly George McClellan, dragged their feet and sought to fight a less than fully committed war. Only Sherman was so insubordinate—and unlike McClellan, he got away with it. But Sherman's vigorous and imaginative generalship and timely victories served Lincoln's larger political goals, with which the general strongly disagreed.

And it all turned on that seemingly innocuous telegram!

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